Princeton computer science professor Edward Felten has posted on his Web site a summary of a study he and Princeton student Sauhard Sahi conducted involving BitTorrent, the peer-to-peer network protocol. Felten and Sahi summarize their study as an investigation into what types of files are available on the system:

BitTorrent is popular because it lets anyone distribute large files at low cost. Which kinds of files are available on BitTorrent? Sauhard Sahi, a Princeton senior, decided to find out. Sauhard’s independent work last semester, under my supervision, set out to measure what was available on BitTorrent. This post, summarizing his results, was co-written by Sauhard and me.

Sahi and Felten chose a random sample of files available “via the trackerless variant of BitTorrent, using the Mainline DHT. The sample comprised 1021 files. He classified the files in the sample by file type, language, and apparent copyright status.” The summary does not clearly identify the time frame (either in length of time, or the time of year) in which Sahi and Felten performed the study.

Summary of the Study Summary

In summary, Sahi and Felten concluded that nearly half the files (46 percent) in the study comprised of non-adult movies and “shows.” (We presume the scholars mean shows — either dramatic serials or game shows — that appear on television.) These category of content would include what the Copyright Act of 1976 defines in Section 101 as “motion pictures” (”Motion pictures are audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any.”) Adult films and computer games and software each accounted for 14 percent of the total files; music accounted for another 10 percent of the files.

The part of the Sahi-Felten study summary that seemed to garner the most attention was the section entitled “Apparent Copyright Infringement.” Wrote the scholars:

Our final assessment involved determining whether or not each file seemed likely to be copyright-infringing. We classified a file as likely non-infringing if it appeared to be (1) in the public domain, (2) freely available through legitimate channels, or (3) user-generated content. These were judgment calls on our part, based on the contents of the files, together with some external research.

…

Overall, we classified ten of the 1021 files, or approximately 1%, as likely non-infringing, This result should be interpreted with caution, as we may have missed some non-infringing files, and our sample is of files available, not files actually downloaded. Still, the result suggests strongly that copyright infringement is widespread among BitTorrent users.

In other words, the pair have drawn a preliminary conclusion that 99 percent of the files in this BitTorrent study infringed U.S. copyright law.

It is virtually impossible to discuss this study or its conclusion without reviewing the final paper, the data, and the data analysis that lead to the conclusions about “Apparent Copyright Infringement.” We and another reader have requested to review that information. We also specifically asked to see the coding sheets, the variables, and a closer look at the variable operationalizations; upon a second glance at the summary, we also would like to review the study design, particularly its sampling design.

(By the way, none of these requests are abnormal for social science studies. It is possible a reviewer may not request coding sheets, for example, but if coding schema are integral to variable operationalizations, then requesting the coding schema is not abnormal either.)

Our Questions

Still, we present some preliminary comments about the summary, and ask some questions about it. (We presume a forthcoming paper will presents the study, its data, and findings in more detail).

First, we would like to know both the time frame and the time span that the study captured. The time frame would determine time of day and time zone; the time frame would identify whether the study spanned the entire summer, a month, a week, or a day. Both are important in terms of measurement and potential data skew, especially if there is only a single temporal element captured and that temporal element is not compared to a second, third, or fourth temporal element.

Also, we would be interested in knowing whether this study was a longitudinal study, or a snapshot of activity; if it is the latter, both the time frame and time span become much more important.

Second, we hope the final paper identifies why the scholars chose “the trackerless variant of BitTorrent, using the Mainline DHT” as the data source, and what were the reasons for excluding other BitTorrent data sources.

Third, we find the scholars’ operationalization of copyright infringement to be interesting. On this issue, the scholars wrote the following:

Our final assessment involved determining whether or not each file seemed likely to be copyright-infringing. We classified a file as likely non-infringing if it appeared to be (1) in the public domain, (2) freely available through legitimate channels, or (3) user-generated content. These were judgment calls on our part, based on the contents of the files, together with some external research.

Based upon the information in the summary, this operationalization of copyright infringement could be problematic for practical and theoretical reasons because it could skew the findings, or fail to provide proper context. In order to determine why we find this problematic, consider our rationale.

The actual definition of copyright infringement in the Copyright Act of 1976 (Section 501(a)) states the following

Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a) … is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.

Effectively, this means that any time any person other than the copyright owner or its authorized agent invokes or uses any of the exclusive rights of reproduction, derivative work/adaptation, distribution, public performance or public display, that person is infringing per Section 501(a). As we have outlined in our sister publication Core Copyright, this use or invocation occurs every minute, of every hour of every day under the current legal regime.

This finding of infringement, of course, is subject to a raft of limitations or compulsory licenses in Sections 107 through 122. These limitations and licenses may mean that a de facto finding of infringement — which, too, is common and virtually automatic under the current legal regime — ultimately falls away, leaving the alleged infringer without legal liability, for reasons of public or economic policy.

The Importance of Operationalizing Infringement

But let’s return to the finding of infringement using the definition in Section 501(a) using the movies as an example. Since copyright infringement is a strict liability issue (i.e roughly meaning liability without fault), this essentially means that anytime anyone posts a file on a BitTorrent system — even a digital movie or music file ripped from their own collections — there is, arguably, an infringement because

(a) the person who owns the source disc from which the movie or music file was ripped is likely not the person that owns any of the Section 106 exclusive rights in the disc (per Section 202); and
(b) therefore has no authority to distribute that file on a digital network.

(The first sale limitation in Section 109 may or may not apply. We will presume for the sake of this argument that it is inapplicable. We also forestall any discussion of reproducing the movies into a digital format in order to get the digital file onto the BitTorrent network in the first place; that activity — which almost certainly occurs by circumventing a digital copy protection technology — likely would violate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.)

This means that from a legal standpoint, it is possible that any file on such a distributed peer-to-peer network is an infringement under Section 501(a), regardless of whether or not the person who uploads the file owns the source disc. (Again, an ultimate and determinative finding of liability would be subject to the limitations and compulsory licenses in Sections 107 through 122 of the current Act.)

How does the legal definition of infringement affect the scholars’ operationalization of infringement in their study?

First, it could affect the study in a significant way if it does not take into account a variable for actual ownership of the source material from which the traded digital file was ripped. This matters, in turn, because the first sale doctrine may be an applicable limitation. (Again, more analysis would need to be done, but it’s worth an investigation.)

Second, if you can determine, operationalize, and make a variable for source ownership, then the study can probe deeper into what type of infringement is really at issue. Again, the issue is not whether or not there is infringing activity occurring on the network; by virtue of the way Congress wrote the infringement statute, infringement is occurring. (See our reasoning above.) Any normative arguments about the realism of applying that statute in that way in a digital networked economy are worthwhile, but will not be addressed in this specific article.

Context, Evidence-Based Findings & Scientific Method

But what we do not yet know is what type of infringement is occurring in this study. And here we distinguish between technical infringements (i.e. people who post stuff they own in disc form, but are trading, lending, or making available in digital form, without knowing what they are doing is, technically, a violation of Section 501(a)) or rogue, behavioral infringement (i.e. people who post stuff they never have rightfully purchased or possessed, and who never intend to buy the source material and merely wants to get stuff for free).

This distinction is critical for several reasons. First, identifying this factor through an operationalized variable and applicable statistical analysis would help begin to classify what type of behavior is behind the infringing activity. In turn, this is important because it begins to strike at the fit between normal behavior and legal standards. It is the common “speed limit” theory of law: if all people are traveling safely at 65 in a 55 m.p.h. zone, why write a speeding ticket? In contrast, if some are traveling at 95 in a 55 m.p.h., is there any good reason not to write a speeding ticket, regardless of the level of traffic?

Second, this distinction is critical because of a phenomenon that already has begun to occur. For example, there are some who may will point to this study as evidence that BitTorrent especially — and peer-to-peer networking, more broadly — is rife with illegal (”piratical”) activity that threatens the livelihood of creators and the companies that help manufacture, distribute, and own the discs that hold the source content (and own the content as well).

Indeed, one commentator already has issued a reflexive and impetuous claim that attempts to link the summary’s findings to a broader policy issue about net neutrality. “Valuable information to keep in mind while debating net neutrality rules and ISPs’ right to manage their networks and fight piracy,” wrote Ben Sheffner of Copyrights and Campaigns last week. In this quote and subsequent responses to reader comments, Sheffner suggested that Internet service providers have a duty restrict infringing traffic on their network, and that this duty should manifest itself in a three-strikes/graduated response policy that has been adopted nationwide in France and is beginning to be adopted in other European Union countries.

(There is plenty of background available on three strikes/graduated response. This article by Canadian attorney Barry Sookman outlines an argument in favor of three-strikes/graduated response. Last year, Sheffner gave his take on what he views as the distinction between “graduated response” from “three-strikes.” EFF posted in November about the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), which has been negotiated in secret, and allegedly includes a three-strikes provision that would affect U.S. law. Michael Geist did a five-part series (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) about ACTA in January, and wrote a separate column about three strikes.)

It is all the more convenient and useful for an advocacy-driven argument in favor of graduated response that “evidence” of BitTorrent’s transmissions would come from someone like Edward Felten because of his credentials and history. As a tenured computer science professor at Princeton, Felten’s work receives a default presumption of validity and prestige. Additionally, Felten had a high-profile experience with U.S. copyright law in 2000, when the recording industry lobby used the DMCA to squelch a scientific paper Felten and fellow scholars wanted to present about circumventing digital encryption on music files. Contextualizing all this information, an advocate could presume that Felten is hostile to copyright law because of this experience, and that publication of this type of result, on this type of paper, with this type of subject matter helps prove beyond a reasonable doubt — along with this Ivy League credentials — that BitTorrent (and by extension, peer-to-peer networks) are dens of copyright iniquity.

But drawing such correlations at this point — with respect to the summary, the resulting paper (which has not yet been vetted, reviewed or published), or Felten’s perceived or actual personal or professional biases — is premature and careless. At this point, no one can state definitively that the Sahi-Felten study provides any correlation between the level of infringing files and the BitTorrent network because no one has nearly enough information based exclusively upon the summary they presented. We cannot say whether Sahi and Felten considered the issues we have raised, or intentionally chose not to address them because they were deemed to be outside the scope of their study. On the basis of the summary alone, we cannot draw even an indirect correlation between this study summary and any need (or even a lack of need) for a three-strikes approach in the United States.

This is why it is important to read — and understand — the design, the variables, the operationalizations, the data collection methods, the statistical analyses in a final, peer-reviewed paper before rendering impulsive opinions about potential applicability to a major policy issue. Further, one needs to know enough about statistical analysis and research design to determine whether there is a skew, whether that skew may have been intentional, and if that skew negatively influences the study’s results. Finally, we need to hear what Sahi and Felten say about the study’s scope, and directions for further research. No matter how well-designed and presented, every study has some limitation, if only because scientific research is not static. Scientists typically live with, and explain, such limitations.

Jumping past this investigation and analysis may be considered acceptable within the context of litigation advocacy, where the objective is to win a specific objective for one’s client. But it is intellectually sloppy from a scientific and empirical perspective. As law professor Justin Hughes once wrote, “[T]he historian or the scientist is trained to research, to explain, and, we hope, to get to the bottom of things. The lawyer — hence, most legal academics— prepares just enough precedent to convince.”

Empiricism and science are the standards from which Sahi and Felten presented their research summary, and those are the standards any resulting final paper must meet. Our questions above are presented from the perspective of social science. Further, research and empirical support — not blind, unilateral advocacy — should be the bases upon which any information policy (especially three-strikes) should be proposed and promulgated.

We can say with a strong level of confidence, however, that the way the current statutes are written, it would have been shocking if anything significantly less than 100% of the files on BitTorrent were technical infringements of copyright law. That reality — and the gap between it and societal norms — is worth continued study.

© Copyright 2010, Copycense. Twitter: @copycense

Technorati Tags: Barry Sookman, Ben Sheffner, BitTorrent, Copyrights & Campaigns, Edward Felten, K. Matthew Dames, Michael Geist, Sauhard Sahi

[Editor’s Note: This is the second of a three-part series on the intersection of trade agreements, foreign affairs, and U.S. copyright law. Part 1 was published on May 28; Part 3 will be published on Tuesday, June 9. Portions of this work are included in a continuing study about the framing of “piracy” and its influence on U.S. copyright law. For ease of reading and formatting, this excludes scholarly references, but replaces them with hyperlinks to source material where such links are available.]

This article summarizes the Special 301 process, including its history, its procedures, and the 2009 Special 301 report.

Background of Section 301

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. sec. 2411), as amended, is the principal statutory authority under which the United States may impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that violate, deny benefits under, or unreasonably discriminate against the U.S. government, or otherwise restrict U.S. commerce, pursuant to a trade agreement. Section 301(a) may be understood as a self-help strategy for discouraging breach of agreement by trading partners.

(a) The Patent Lobby

The seeds for the contemporary Section 301 process were sown in the mid-seventies. Partly as a reaction to the Watergate scandal, Congress adopted several reforms that sought decentralization of government and allowed private companies to influence trade policy. IBM and Pfizer were two of the first companies that recognized the need for a global approach to intellectual property protection. In the late 1970s, the CEOs of these two companies “devised a strategy to improve intellectual property protection internationally until American standards became the international norm, especially in developing countries.”

Pfizer sought “significant reform” of the Paris Convention, while IBM sought patent treaty reform and full copyright implementation under the Berne Convention (especially reforming Berne to recognize the copyrightability of software). Together, the two companies sought multilateral diplomacy through the General Agreement on Trade & Tariffs’ Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiation (“ACTPN”). Pfizer chief executive officer Edmund Pratt and IBM chief executive officer John Opel held high level positions on ACTPN.

By 1985, ACTPN was playing a major role in U.S. trade policy. Around the same time, the U.S. economy was struggling from the effects of large trade deficits with several foreign countries. Industry associations identified and blamed a foreign, monolithic enemy: “pirates.” U.S. corporate executives convinced members of Congress that America’s economy and the nation’s long term economic and innovation competitiveness would improve only if the country passed trade laws that levied stiff punishments for continuing trade violations, especially those that involved “piracy” of intellectual property.

This led to a number of changes to trade policy. For example, ACTPN recommended that the U.S. Office of the Trade Representative (“USTR”) create a post of assistant trade representative for investment; USTR did so in 1981. In 1985, ACTPN established an intellectual property task force in 1985, with Pratt, Opel, and Fritz Attaway serving. (Attaway is executive vice president and Washington general counsel for the Motion Picture Association of America, where he has worked since 1976.)

From this core, ACTPN worked to educate people in Congress and in the executive branch (especially USTR) about the importance of protecting intellectual property rights as a way of facilitating investment in developing countries. Part of the education included targeting Washington policy makers with conferences and books, both of which emphasized that American competitiveness in innovation industries was being hurt by developing countries’ failure to pass or enforce laws that protected American intellectual property. As a result, USTR spent much more time and diplomatic effort in putting intellectual property issues on the GATT Uruguay Round agenda in 1986, ultimately consulting ACTPN on a “GATT strategy.”

(The GATT Uruguay Round strategy was a “carrot and stick” approach to trade and intellectual property negotiations with developing countries. On one hand, the U.S. offered tariff concessions on agricultural and textile products and technical training on intellectual property issues. In exchange, the U.S. wanted higher levels of intellectual property protection to combat “piracy” and counterfeiting. A foreign country’s failure to comply would result in cutting the country’s aid through America’s General System of Preferences, and possible trade sanctions pursuant to Section 301 actions. Said more simply, where bilateral and multilateral trade concessions GATT Uruguay Round are the carrot, Section 301 actions are the stick, a form of unilateral sanctions.)

The Intellectual Property Committee (“IPC”) was another important trade group that started work during this period. IPC’s purpose was to be a spokesman for intellectual property-based companies and lobby their interests in Washington and Geneva. Charter members were Pfizer, IBM, Merck, General Electric, DuPont, Warner Communications, Hewlett-Packard, Bristol-Meyers, FMC Corporation, General Motors, Johnson & Johnson, Monsanto, and Rockwell International.

(b) The Copyright Lobby

While ACTPN and IPC handled multilateral GATT diplomacy strategy, the corporate owners of large copyright portfolios became concerned that the ACTPN was too focused on patent issues. Those companies began seeking their own bilateral strategy to strengthen international copyright laws, resulting in the formation of the International Intellectual Property Alliance (“IIPA”). IIPA charter members included the American Association of Publishers; the Motion Picture Association of America; and the Recording Industry Association of America. The Business Software Association and Interactive Digital Software Association since have joined IIPA.

Created in 1984, IIPA also was established to advocate an agenda for the USTR’s Section 301 report, which Congress codified in the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Among other things, the 1984 Trade Act clarified the Section 301 review process, for which copyright creators had lobbied. In 1985, IIPA submitted to USTR a report entitled Piracy of U.S. Copyrighted Works in Ten Selected Countries that presented data from IIPA members that estimated $1.3 billion in lost film, music, computer software, and books sales due to “piracy.”

USTR responded by initiating a Section 301 investigation against Korea. Based in part upon this initial report, IIPA lobbied Congress to institutionalize the measurement of copyright problems in foreign countries, leading to an amended Section 301.

Section 301 Process Overview

The Section 301 process works in the following way:

1. Initiation: Any interested party – usually a private sector interest group – files a petition with USTR to request that the government agency investigate a possible trade violation. (USTR also may initiate an investigation on its own.)
2. Publication: USTR publishes its determination to initiate an investigation (or reasons for not initiating in the case of a petition) in the Federal Register.
3. Hearing: A public hearing is required if USTR initiates a Section 301 investigation.
4. Consultations: Once an investigation begins, USTR must request consultations with the foreign government.
5. Settlement: Where an investigation involves an alleged violation of a trade agreement (such as a World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)), USTR must follow the dispute settlement provisions set out in that agreement.
6. Conclusion: USTR must conclude its investigation and make a determination of whether the foreign practice is actionable under Section 301 within 18 months after initiation of an investigation involving a trade agreement that includes a dispute settlement mechanism, or 30 days after conclusion of dispute settlement procedures, which ever comes first.

The Trade Representative’s use of Section 301 as a procedural stick in intellectual property protection is recent. In 1984, USTR held little institutional knowledge about intellectual property matters. At the urging of IIPA members, the Office hired a new deputy trade officer, intellectual property lawyer on staff whose primary job was to advise USTR staff on issues of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Armed with new expertise and IIPA data, USTR started a Section 301 action in fall 1985 against South Korea.

IIPA complained South Korean businesses were extensively “pirating” books, music, film and software, and the organization claimed annual sales losses in Korea totaling $150 million. This may seem an insignificant amount now, but given the time frame – mid-1980s; high inflation; large trade deficits, particularly to Asian countries – this estimate was significant enough to warrant the attention of U.S. government officials. Korean negotiators insisted that the country’s level of development was insufficient to revise its intellectual property laws. The U.S. countered by threatening to strip Korea of its benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences.

In July 1986, Korea and the U.S. reached an agreement whereby Korea would revise its copyright laws, become a signatory to a number of international copyright treaties, and pledge to strengthen penalties against copyright infringement. Korea also pledged more aggressive patent enforcement. This was USTR’s first successful implementation of the Section 301 process against foreign country based upon “piracy.”

It is common for a private sector group to initiate a Section 301 petition against a foreign country because of alleged “piracy” issues. Initiating petitions, however, puts U.S. companies at risk of having foreign governments retaliate against their overseas subsidiaries. The retaliation can take the form of selective regulatory enforcement or questionable contract awards.

To guard against this possibility, Congress in August 1988 passed Special 301 as part of the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. Sponsored by former Illinois Congressman Dan Rostenkowski and referred to in some quarters as a “velvet fist in an iron glove,” Special 301 requires USTR to identify nations that fail to protect the intellectual property rights of U.S. companies by April 30 annually.

Any country whose acts, policies, or practices are “the most onerous or egregious” and have not entered into (or are significantly progressing toward) negotiations to provide adequate and effective intellectual property regulation the USTR must designate as a “priority foreign countries.” Countries that USTR does not designate as “priority foreign countries” may appear on “priority watch” or “watch” lists if the U.S. government is concerned about their intellectual property laws or enforcement practices.

As before the 1988 amendment, industry organizations play a vital role in filing petitions (requiring USTR follow up) and providing evidence of economic losses due to “piracy.” For example, in a response to USTR’s required Federal Register posting requesting public comment on country identification for the Special 301 report, IIPA earlier this year submitted “[its] discussion of the types, levels, and costs of piracy, an evaluation of enforcement practices to reduce those levels, and the status of copyright law reform in 60 separate country reports.” Referencing its Jan. 30, 2007, report entitled “Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy,” (.pdf) IIPA claimed in a 22-page cover letter (.pdf) that

“core” U.S. copyright industries accounted for an estimated $819.06 billion or 6.56% of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005. These “core” industries were responsible for 12.96% of the growth achieved in 2005 for the U.S. economy as a whole (this means that the growth contributed by these core industries (12.96%) was almost double their current dollar share of GDP (6.56%)). In addition, the “core” copyright industries employed 5.38 million workers in 2005 (4.03% of U.S. workers) in 2005.

It is essential to the continued growth and future competitiveness of these industries that our trading partners provide not only free and open markets, but also high levels of protection to the copyrights on which this trade depends. This protection upon which so much U.S. economic performance rests is under constantly evolving threats, and it is critical to sustain U.S. economic competitiveness that our country’s response remains flexible, innovative and committed. There are certain sectors of the U.S. copyright community, notably the music sector, that has already witnessed significant declines in foreign sales and royalty remittances as a consequence of increased levels and new forms of piracy, and it is essential that we address these problems on an urgent basis.

The IIPA mentioned the term “piracy” 93 times in the cover letter. None of those mentions is consistent with the term’s primary definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oxford English Dictionary, or the United States Code.

The 2009 Special 301 Report

The 2009 Special 301 report, which the USTR released on April 30, examined more than 40 countries, placing a dozen (China, Russia, Algeria, Argentina, Canada, Chile, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand and Venezuela) on the “priority watch” list (PWL). The number of countries on the report’s “priority watch list” has remained relatively stable over the years. (In 2007, there were 12 countries on the “priority watch list.” In 2008, nine countries made the list. China, Russia, Argentina, India, and Thailand have made the PWL each of the last three years.)

USTR placed more than 30 additional countries on its 2009 “watch list.”

Canada was perhaps this year’s most surprising inclusion on the 2009 PWL. Over the past three years, Canada has experienced considerable citizen interest in (and resistance against) government proposals to increase the country’s level of copyright protection, most notably through a Facebook group organized by University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist. The citizenry’s effectiveness in halting government proposals to spread stronger protections, however, has led to disapproval from the U.S., its southern neighbor:

[T]he Government of Canada has not delivered on … commitments [to improve IPR protection and enforcement] by promptly and effectively implementing key copyright reforms. The United States continues to have serious concerns with Canada’s failure to accede to and implement the WIPO Internet Treaties, which Canada signed in 1997. We urge Canada to enact legislation in the near term to strengthen its copyright laws and implement these treaties. The United States also continues to urge Canada to improve its IPR enforcement system to enable authorities to take effective action against the trade in counterfeit and pirated products within Canada, as well as curb the volume of infringing products transshipped and transiting through Canada. Canada’s weak border measures continue to be a serious concern for IP owners.

Part of the reform the U.S. wants Canada to pass is C-61, legislation that mirrors the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Since the Canadian government has had difficulty in passing this and similar legislation, the U.S. has placed it alongside perennial PWL countries like Russia and China.

Copyright on Twitter: twitter.com/copycense

Technorati Tags: Copycense, K. Matthew Dames, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Special 301

Last week, the Associated Press issued several DMCA takedown notices on a Web site called Workbench, claiming the site had infringed its copyright when it posted ledes and titles from a handful of AP stories. The Associated Press, which is a cooperative owned by more than 1,000 newspapers, which contribute content to the collective and use content from it. I am intimately familiar with the AP and how it works, and think that the cooperative has evolved into an influential, primary news organization because so many newspapers have abandoned original reporting in so many areas due to real or perceived financial pressures.

(Next time you read your local newspaper, take notice of how many stories are wire service stories from AP, Reuters, Agence France Presse, or a similar agency.)

AP’s tactics, however, raise some interesting issues about copyright’s use and applicability in a networked information environment, where virtually every action invokes one of the six exclusive rights.

I address these issues in no particular order.

1. The DMCA Takedown Process: I’ll address both sides of the same coin. The first side is an opinion many hold: “The DMCA takedown process is flawed and must be amended.” The safe harbor provisions under Section 512 allow a “service provider” to avoid infringement liability so long as the “service provider” removes or disables access to the allegedly infringing content upon being served with the takedown notice. As Wendy Seltzer illustrated last year, the takedown provisions do not provide for any assessment of fair use (or any other copyright exception), and provide weak safeguards against abuse. (For example, retailers like WalMart abuse the process every Thanksgiving holiday by issuing takedown notices for holiday sales information that, by any reasonable measure, is factual — and therefore not subject to copyright protection.)

The flip side is equally compelling, yet not quite as popular: “Service providers should not roll over reflexively and accept such DMCA notices without investigation.” Granted, there are costs associated to training staff to handle these notices properly, but those are fixed costs that come with this particular business. An ISP would have to train its staff to handle any sort of legal notice, including a subpoena, so DMCA notification training should not be an issue.

(See Section 512(k)(1) for a definition of “service provider.”)

Further, I see nothing in the takedown procedures that requires any sort of investigation into the paper’s validity or credence, and a strict reading of the statute may prohibit such an investigation … so long as the “service provider” is satisfied simply to comply with the DMCA and punt on any extralegal responsibility it may have to its customers. My reading of this tortuously long statute indicates that it “service providers” are required to expeditiously remove, or disable access to allegedly infringing material in order to qualify for the “safe harbor.” Absent qualifying for the safe harbor, I see nothing that requires “service providers” to expeditiously remove, or disable access to allegedly infringing material.

What is the worst that could happen if a “service provider” decided to question the takedown process, and in the process disqualify itself for the “safe harbor”? It gets sued for copyright infringement? Surely, no person or entity wants to get sued, but is it too much for ISPs to show a little spine on this issue, especially if the spine showing results in bad press for the copyright owners? (Oddly, bad press for the copyright owners may actually help keep the issue out of the courts. And bad press may be the only effective tactic left in stemming the inexorable march toward narrower interpretations of copyright exceptions that don’t require compensation or permission.)

Besides, an ISP recently showed some spine and objected to some of the DMCA’s provisions: Verizon, for example, litigated the DMCA subpoena provisions … and actually won.

2. The Trial Balloon: Once The New York Times got hold of the story, the Associated Press had retreated from its initial, aggressive actions, calling them “heavy-handed.” The implication is that an overzealous legal department ran amuck without consulting the business side of the building.

This is garbage. The AP knew exactly what it was doing, and the legal department had full sanction from (and was in consultation with) the business side of the building. In fact, I’d go so far as to say that AP did not consider their actions to be “heavy-handed” until the Times inquired about this issue. (It is significant that the Times is a cooperative owner of AP, and also has increased its implementation of blogs in the newsroom and on its Web site.)

This is not an accident at all. The AP wanted to see how aggressive it could get, and for how long, before its actions were (a) noticed by business partners (or at least entities or executives it respects), and (b) questioned or criticized by those partners. AP will use this incident (and the reaction) in the future as a barometer for how aggressive it can be in proscribing uses of its content that are not explicitly licensed. Next, what we’ll likely see is a new AP content license that is promoted specifically for bloggers. Part of the market research for such an initiative, however, is occurring now, with this shot across the bow.

The concept of a content license for bloggers is neither new, nor necessarily negative. But that license will be positioned as an insurance policy: buy the license and we won’t sue; but if you don’t buy the license, then we make no guarantees. It is the proverbial Corleonic proposition.

Implicit in the “no guarantee” part of the equation is AP’s behavior in this situation. When this issue arises in the future, the AP’s rationale will be that while there were no (or fewer) licensing options when AP approached Workbench in June 2008, now (whenever that time in the future is) you have options … in the form of the license. The options won’t be “fair use or some other exception,” “fair use or not fair use,” or even “fair use or license,” but instead “license or risk getting sued.”

I think AP is beta testing future business initiatives (and perhaps stalling for time to get its initiatives together) while using allegations of copyright infringement and the hammer of a lawsuit. This is not the first time a large copyright portfolio has done this: I think the RIAA has done this for years, for example. I think the three academic publishers who sued Georgia State University for alleged infringement via electronic reserves are doing exactly the same thing, under the guise of “protecting authors” and maintaining incentives for future authors to publish.

The problem I see with this tactic is that it narrows attempts to render irrelevant any discussion of the bevy of copyright exceptions that are allowed under the law. Muting discussion of exceptions works consistently with promoting licensing as a solution to avoiding copyright infringement. “Don’t worry about copyright; it’s too complicated. Buy the license and be secure in knowing that you (or your organization) are in compliance,” goes the pitch. What the pitch really is saying though, is “Pay for everything without referring to the copyright exceptions that, under certain circumstances, will allow parties to use, access, reproduce, distribute, or remix portions of protected works without having to ask for permission and without having to pay.” That’s not a solution; that’s a surrender.

Dastardly? Perhaps. Cynical? Maybe. Beyond the realm of possibility in an overheated copyright environment? Absolutely not.

3. Fair Use & the Inverted Pyramid: In the same Times story, writer Saul Hansell reported the following:

Even if The A.P. sets standards, bloggers could choose to use more content than its standards permit, and then The A.P. would have to decide whether to take legal action against them. One important legal test of whether an excerpt exceeds fair use is if it causes financial harm to the copyright owner.

“The principal question is whether the excerpt is a substitute for the story, or some established adaptation of the story,” said Timothy Wu, a professor at the Columbia Law School. Mr. Wu said that the case is not clear-cut, but he believes that The A.P. is likely to lose a court case to assert a claim on that issue.

“It’s hard to see how the Drudge Retort ‘first few lines’ is a substitute for the story,” Mr. Wu said.

Associated Press, obviously, thinks differently. In a June 3 letter to Rogers Cadenhead, Workbench’s editor, the news cooperative’s Intellectual Property Governance Coordinator wrote the following:

… you purport that the Drudge Retort’s users reproduce and display AP headlines and leads under a fair use defense. Please note that contrary to your assertion, AP considers that the Drudge Retort users’ use of AP content does not fall within the parameters of fair use. The use is not fair use simply because the work copied happened to be a news article and that the use is of the headline and the first few sentences only. This is a misunderstanding of the doctrine of “fair use.” AP considers taking the headline and lede of a story without a proper license to be an infringement of its copyrights, and additionally constitutes “hot news” misappropriation.

(By the way, isn’t “Intellectual Property Governance Coordinator” a great title? I would have settled for “IP Majordomo,” but Intellectual Property Governance Coordinator sounds magisterial.)

There is a practical problem with Professor Wu’s statement, and it is connected to Associated Press’s interpretation of fair use: journalists write news stories using a technique called the inverted pyramid. In the inverted pyramid form of writing, a news story’s most substantive, important, and informative information appears near the top of the article, while contextual information falls further down into later paragraphs. Essentially, the inverted pyramid form of writing requires news stories to answer the most important questions — who, what, when, where, how (and set the tone for answering “why”) — within the first three paragraphs. In the tightest news writing, a reader should be able to answer the most important questions in the first 3 to 5 sentences, which include the “lede” (or lead).

The rationale behind the technique is quite sensible: it allows readers with little time a way to be informed quickly, particularly if one is scanning the paper. The technique, which has been around and used for centuries, represents a CNN-style of reporting that existed before Ted Turner even was born.

From a legal perspective, though, one could argue reasonably that the inverted pyramid technique, combined with contemporary blogging practices, has an effect on fair use. If you look at the four-plus factor test in Section 107 and compare it to how news writers construct their stories using the inverted pyramid, the first 3 to 5 lines of a news story essentially constitute factors three (”amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”) and four (”the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”). Said another way, the inverted paragraph form of writing — which includes “the first few lines of a story” that Wu claims could not be a substitute for a story — is a substitute for the story. That what it always has been designed to be. By extension, if online writers are using the first few lines of a news story, and news stories (almost universally) are written in the inverted pyramid format, then online writers that use those lines are substituting for the news story.

Let me take it a step further. If findings for or against fair use are based upon a theory of commercial substitution, then it seems that every use of a news story’s first few lines is, a commercial substitution that finds against fair use. Fair use should not be winnowed down exclusively to commercial substitution, but given Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (”[the fourth factor of Section 107] is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”) and the fair use’ otherwise vague and inaccessible nature, most folks will use commercial substitution as the clearest guideline in an otherwise foggy doctrine. (This is especially true of copyright portfolio owners, because they can argue that virtually any invocation of the exclusive rights rights is (or may be) a commercial substitution, and therefore, beyond the scope of fair use.)

To be fair, William Patry has called “erroneous” the Harper & Row court’s assertion that the fourth factor is “undoubtedly the single most important factor,” but I do not know of any comparable holding that explicitly overturns that analysis, or any trend that suggests federal courts are no longer relying on it.

For these reasons, I see Associated Press’ actions last week as having long-lasting commercial, political, and journalistic importance.

Update (June 23, 2008): In a Friday, June 20 posting to The New York Times’ Bits blog, writer Saul Hansell reported that Associated Press and Workbench editor Roger Cadenhead “consider the matter closed” as of Thursday, June 19. Hansell’s post links to Cadenhead’s reportage about the dispute’s end. Cadenhead’s post, in turn, discusses AP’s use of tracking technologies from a company called Attributor, a Redwood City, Calif. company that has had AP as a client since May 2007. (Interestingly, Cadenhead notes, Attributor posted a blog earlier this year that advised its clients to send a link request instead of a DMCA takedown notice.)

Cadenhead also notes that AP already offers fee-based services whereby customers pay for headlines and lede paragraphs. (We presume Cadenhead is referring to AP Exchange or AP Digital.)

Additionally, Cadenhead also mentioned the willingness of parties like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge to assist his legal fight. Since both organizations seem to choose their issues and legal fights with extreme care, it is fair to say both parties were as interested in the potential for positive publicity as the legal issues.

Finally, Hansell’s report surmises what occurred between AP’s issuance takedown notice of the takedown notices, and the apparent detente late last week. In the end, none of the thorny legal issues got resolved and no one seems to want to discuss the key issues on the record. The veil of silence that surrounds the “settlement” reinforces our conviction that AP was using this issue as a trial balloon, both to gauge public opinion and to use as a test case for future business initiatives.

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Jon Stokes. Proposed EU ISP Filtering and Copyright Extension Shot Down. ArsTechnica. Jan. 22, 2008. Just as AT&T begins considering filtering on its network for alleged copyright infringement violations, the European Union decides not to allow it for now on ISP networks in member countries. But as long as intellectual property is seen as an “economic engine” — and who’s not looking for an “economic engine” with this credit crisis upon us — this issue will not go away easily.

(Editor’s Note: Copycense editors originally commented on this article in the Jan. 29, 2008, edition of Copycense Clippings.)

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Nate Anderson. Warner Sues “Playable Search Engine,” Tests DMCA Safe Harbor. ArsTechnica. Jan. 25, 2008. Warner Bros. trots out all the goodies in its 57-page complaint (.pdf) that alleges copyright infringement by search engine SeeqPod. One of the ways in which SeeqPod tries to differentiate itself is by providing links to music or video files that others make available on the Web. (For example, we typed in a search “jay-z” and received about 20 hits, many of which were links to YouTube videos. We were able to watch the YouTube videos within the SeeqPod site instead of having to link out to YouTube to get the content.)

Apparently, SeeqPod compiles search results not only through the work of its own search robot, but also through user-contributed submissions. Warner Bros. has seized on this second aspect to frame SeeqPod as a business that “aims to capitalize on the illegal use of ‘free’ music to grow its user base rapidly and inexpensively,” accusing the search provider of direct infringement, contributory infringement, vicarious infringement. WB also throws in MGM v. Grokster’s inducement liability theory (just for kicks and giggles).

One of the interesting things about this case is SeeqPod’s technology was born in the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory; the Lab also has a 5% stake in the spin-off company. So, in essence, Warner Bros. also is suing the federal government. Another interesting tidbit: Anderson notes that Last.fm has a similar search capability, but also has licensing deals in place with the major music labels, while SeeqPod has no licensing deals and seems to rest its business model on the DMCA ISP safe harbor at Section 512(c). We hate to see a promising technology like this get ensnared in litigation so early in its life, but in the unlikely event this goes to trial, this could be an interesting case.

(Editor’s Note: Copycense editors originally commented on this article in the Jan. 29, 2008, edition of Copycense Clippings.)

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Tim Wu. Has AT&T Lost Its Mind? Slate. Jan. 16, 2008. Columbia law professor Wu rhetorically poses the obvious question in response to news that AT&T is considering proposals to filter content, ostensibly to halt alleged copyright infringement. Wu delves more deeply into the “safe harbor” provisions of Section 512 than we did when we first reported this story in last week’s Clippings, and offers some interesting thoughts about why AT&T would even consider such an effort.

(Editor’s Note: Copycense editors originally commented on this article in the Jan. 22, 2008, edition of Copycense Clippings.)

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Bits (The New York Times). AT&T and Other I.S.P.’s May Be Getting Ready to Filter. Jan. 8, 2008. Apparently not content with the “safe harbor” provisions that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act affords (it and other ISPs) pursuant to Section 512(c) of the Copyright Act, the former Ma Bell floats a filtering trial balloon at the Consumer Electronics Show. Comcast already faces scrutiny concerning its alleged filtering of Bittorrent traffic, so it will be interesting to see how this issue plays among Washington regulators who have jurisdiction over communications and trade.

(Editor’s Note: Copycense editors originally commented on this article in the Jan. 15, 2008, edition of Copycense Clippings.)

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