Editor’s Note: Copycense executive editor K. Matthew Dames interviews William Patry a second time. (The first interview occurred in late 2006, and was published in 2007, the same year West Publishing released the multi-volume treatise Patry on Copyright.) This second interview, completed in late August 2009, deals exclusively with Patry’s new book, Moral Panics & The Copyright Wars (2009, Oxford University Press) [Amazon.com; Barnes & Noble; author’s book blog]

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K. Matthew Dames: After writing several scholarly works and treatises (including the current Patry on Copyright and the revised Patry on Fair Use), Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars is your first general market book. Why this book at this time?

William Patry: I have been concerned for awhile about the type of discourse used in the debates about copyright. I thought and still think it is generally unhealthy, and in some cases, deliberately unhealthy. George Orwell once wrote that words can corrupt thought, and I believe this has happened in the copyright debates. I set out to find out why this was going on, and how to change the discourse by making it healthy again.

Dames: Moral Panics … opens with a discussion of business models, and your general argument that copyright law has been used too often to control what consumers do with products, rather than encouraging platforms that give (paying) consumers what they want. This book also was researched and written during a time when, for the first time, you have been in-house counsel to a technology company. To what extent did your work as a business lawyer spur your research into business models?

Patry: I have been privileged to work in lots of difference environments: private practice, government service, academia, and now in-house. You learn a lot from each experience. Certainly the greatest benefit to being in-house is learning business stuff, so being in-house has definintely sensitized me to business issues in a way I wasn’t before. I hope that is helpful too for readers.

Dames: In Moral Panics …, you spend a lot of time discussing language and rhetoric. How did you become interested in this area?

Patry: I became interested because language and rhetoric is so prevalent in the copyright debates and has driven policy decisions, something I think is regrettable.

Dames: Moral Panics … also includes several extended discussions about how language is used to shape the parameters of debates and political issues. In your former work with the House of Representatives, you must have heard several interesting arguments or statements. In your view, which person or organization has been the best at using language to best articulate their point of view and why was that person or organization so effective?

Patry: George Lakoff, a very liberal Democrat and a cognitive linguistic, has written extensively about how conservatives are masters of framing political debates, and I would be surprised if many disagreed. As the opposition now, of course, they don’t have responsibility for actually accomplishing anything, which gives them a lot more room to maneuver.

Dames: On page 29 of Moral Panics .., you write

The response of the heads of these companies to the youthful rebellion of democratizing content on the Internet has been that of may parents worldwide: to fight against the present, to try to ban the future, and to punish those audacious enough to challenge the status quo. The Copyright Wars are a fight against our own children, and it is a fight that says everything about adults and very little about the children.

As a father who purchases lots of books, films, and music for your children — and as a scholar who has objected to “educational” initiatives geared toward children like “Kopyright Kids” and “Captain Copyright” — what conversations do you have with your children about copyright and what their relationship is, or should be, with protected works?

Patry: I think parents have a great deal of responsibility, really the primary responsibility, which should be exercised both by example and by ensuring their kids act responsibly.

Dames: If you had one resource to recommend to your children to teach them about copyright, what would it be?

Patry: Creating something themselves and figuring out how they wanted it used by others online.

Dames: In Moral Panics …, you talk a lot about the consumer, the purchaser, and the end user and their relationship (or lack of relationship) with copyright law. Historically, copyright law and policy in the United States have been debated and discussed in a way that presumes the sole affected audience is large, corporate copyright owners, and you and University of Michigan law profession Jessica Litman have written about the legislative process that goes into making copyright legislation. Further, you have written about the current national copyright reform conversation occurring in Canada. What elements or conditions do you believe would need to exist in the United States so that a similar conversation or reform effort may occur?

Patry: I think that Michael Geist in Canada has shown the short of grassroots movement that is effective, and I think technology companies need to educate policymakers about what they do, in detail.

Dames: What issues are not addressed in the book that you wish you had addressed?

Patry: There are two: Marissa Mayer’s theory of the atomic unit of consumption [.pdf], and the discsussion by Gwenyth Jackaway in her 1995 book called Media at War: Radio’s Challenge to the Newspapers, 1924-1939. (See Slate article.) Her book is a great example of what I am talking about in a different era.

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Editor’s Note: William F. Patry has a new book out entitled Moral Panics & The Copyright Wars (2009, Oxford University Press) [Amazon.com; Barnes & Noble; author’s book blog]. Patry, one of this nation’s foremost authorities on copyright, also is the author of the eight-volume treatise Patry on Copyright and serves as the senior copyright counsel for Google, Inc.

Copycense executive editor K. Matthew Dames interviewed Patry in late 2006; the interview was published in June 2007, the same year West Publishing released Patry on Copyright. Since then, West has republished Patry’s book on fair use, Patry on Fair Use.

Here, we republish the interview between Dames and Patry in its entirety on Copycense for the first time, updating where appropriate and adding new, previously unpublished material from the original 2006 transcript. Links to entries in Patry’s now retired blog, The Patry Copyright Blog, are made where appropriate. Copycense has arranged to interview Patry again about Moral Panics; that interview will occur and be published soon.

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K. Matthew Dames: Why don’t you give us some background as to how Patry on Copyright came about?

William Patry: I wrote a treatise on fair use in 1985 [entitled The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law] and that had a second edition in 1995. After I finished the ‘85 edition of it, my mentor in copyright, Alan Latman, came down with pancreatic cancer. At the time, he was in the process of updating a one-volume treatise on copyright that he had authored. I offered to help him do research and sort of be his gopher, and he agreed. I prepared several extensive outlines for that, but unfortunately [Latman] died before any more work was done. I then took over his one-volume work [entitled Latman’s The Copyright Law] and did a second edition of that.

Eventually, I decided that work was too constraining, and that I wanted to do something more. I then took that book and expanded it tremendously, and made it a three-volume book that was published in 1995. That was Copyright Law & Practice, two volumes of text and one volume of appendix.

I did annual supplements to that for a number of years and disliked the format. I disliked it being totally hard copy; I disliked the manner in which updates were done, which was free-standing rather than looseleaf. And I decided “Forget it” – I’m just going to start from scratch and do it over again, do a much larger book and rethink things.

I had a falling out with my publisher about the direction and format the [new] book would take. They had a sort of 19th century view of what treatises should be: they should be hard copy, they shouldn’t be online, they shouldn’t be looseleaf, and I decided that really wasn’t the way to go. [I thought] things had to be on Westlaw or Lexis, or some sort of online form. Further, while there were an appreciable number of people who liked hardcopy, [I thought] for them you needed a looseleaf.

I hunted around, and finally came to a deal with West. But during the time I was in between publishers, I radically changed my opinion of the way I thought a treatise should be. I had always been a specialist; I had been practicing copyright law for 25 years. And that has a lot of benefits: certainly the level of experience at which I was able to practice, I saw things from a lot of different angles. [Ed.: Patry has been copyright counsel to the House of Representatives for more than a decade; a law professor at Yeshiva University’s Cardozo School of Law; and a lawyer in private practice.] But I was always seeing things through the lens of a specialist.

On the other hand, most people who read treatises are academics and judges. I decided I would retool the book to direct it toward judges, who are generalists, as well as take into account a lot of other things I was interested in: cognitive linguistics, logic, the way in which the Internet had transformed research. About midway through this process – probably around 2003 – I decided to change course dramatically and that took me another three years to do it. Ultimately, the book became much longer and took me in a different direction than when I started. This was one of the reasons it took me so long.

Dames: Anyone who has done work in the copyright field is familiar with the treatise Nimmer on Copyright, which long has been promoted as the most cited copyright treatise in the federal courts. Now for the first time, there are two multi-volume copyright treatises on the market. In your view, what is the distinction between Patry on Copyright and Nimmer on Copyright?

Patry: Well, we’re very different people. I didn’t inherit somebody else’s book; I did mine from scratch. And in doing it from scratch, I had a lot more freedom, I think. Clearly, there are benefits from inheriting the standard book in the field, but the downside is that in many ways you’re sort of stuck with what’s there. So I viewed the task of creating something myself from scratch as being liberating that way.

David Nimmer, before he took over his father’s treatise, was an assistant United States Attorney, and not doing copyright stuff. [Ed.: David Nimmer’s father was the late UCLA law professor Melville Nimmer, the original author of Nimmer on Copyright.] His treatise reflects his father’s learning in the field, and whatever he has learned since he took it over. My experience, I think, is unique. … My book contains stuff that reflects my background. So, I have a chapter on statutory interpretation – which certainly is in no other treatise that I know of – that describes not only how to interpret the Copyright Act, but how statutory interpretation works. And that comes from having written a lot of copyright provisions.

I like to approach things in what, I hope, is a ruthless, unsentimental way. To me, it doesn’t matter if what’s being critiqued is something I wrote, or somebody else wrote, or a judge wrote. I try to be transparent and try to figure out, to the best of my ability, what I think the correct answer is.

I’d be happy for there to five or six different treatises out there. The more learning we have, the more people doing research, the better it is for everyone. And it certainly keeps everyone else on their toes. And that’s why I do a separate blog for the treatise, and that’s why I allow anonymous postings to that blog. I’ll develop a thick skin, and if people take me to task, that’s great. A friend of mine said to me once that the best way to know you have a mind is to change it. I agree with that 100 percent. If someone comes along and says “Hey, you got this wrong,” to me, I’m not going to be defensive. To me, you did me a favor. I’ve learned something that day.

Dames: I found it interesting in looking at some of the [treatise’s] categories that you have [that] fair use is a large chunk of material, and I think people would expect that. Remedies is also a large chunk of material, and I think people would expect that. What surprised me was the number of pages devoted to jurisdiction. Could you talk about that?

Patry: If you look at the remedies chapter itself it would surprise you because, consistent with my earlier comments, what I tried to do there was is to place copyright inside the general jurisprudence on remedies. First of all, while there are certain peculiarities in copyright law – for example, statutory damages – the concept of actual damages or profits is no different in copyright than they are in any other form of the law. So one has to take that into account.

In terms of injunctions, there are special things in copyright law – for example, the presumption of irreparable harm once somebody has made a prima facie case of infringement. What I discovered through research and my own views is that the way in which copyright law has been treated specially – as if there is a niche, as if the general rules on preliminary injunctions somehow don’t apply to intellectual property – really are wrong. So I spend a lot of time on the general doctrines of preliminary injunctive relief. I have a circuit-by-circuit breakdown on just general law: how the circuits deal with preliminary injunctions. Then, I place that within how [the courts] deal with intellectual property, and trace the origins of this idea that there should be a presumption of irreparable harm once you make out a prima facie case of infringement; how it came about; how I think it went wrong; and how it may, for example, conflict with the Supreme Court’s more recent eBay case.

Another example of that is in the chapter on statute of limitations, which is a fairly long chapter for that discrete topic in what might be regarded as a specialty treatise. There has long been a supposition that the Seventh Circuit [Court of Appeals] is sort of off on its own … that somehow they treat statute of limitations differently. And you’ll see lots of many cases from other circuits, and lots of commentators say that. So I spent about three months just steeping myself in general statute of limitations law, learning as much as I could about it. I then discovered that, in fact, there is no such split in the circuits at all. While there may be some language that would make someone think that [there is a split], indeed it’s not true. And I actually confirmed that with some of the judges in the cases, and I sort of lay out how general limitations law works, and how it has been applied in copyright cases. You discover there’s no split in the circuit. That’s sort of another example of how my attempt to educate myself about general law, and then place copyright in general law, paid off. But it only paid off because I attempted to take the time to really steep myself in general limitations law.

The [jurisdiction chapter] arose out of the same instinct that led me to have fairly long chapters on remedies and statute of limitations. For jurisdiction, there are two elements. First, part of it deals with Copyright Office registration practices. I could have treated that as a separate chapter, but since [such issues] really are encountered as a jurisdictional question – “Do you have a registration or not?” is a subject matter jurisdiction question; “Is your registration valid or not?” “Is there fraud in the Copyright Office?” – those sort of issues arise within challenges that typically come at the jurisdictional phase. So within that admittedly long chapter, there is substantive discussion about Copyright Office practices on registration. So that accounts for some of it.

But the other part of that chapter is just general law: personal jurisdiction; subject matter jurisdiction, forum selection; venue selection clauses, and those things. The reason for that, again, is my desire to understand general law, but it also came from reading [nearly] 30,000 copyright cases. If you look at the volume of cases, the majority of cases are jurisdictional cases involving copyright. The ones that people tend to focus on are the substantive ones: “Is it infringement” “Is it fair use?” “What are the remedies?” Those [issues] are all important, but if you look at what is the actual meat-and-potatoes stuff that litigators and judges face in copyright cases, the majority of those [issues] are jurisdictional. So I felt that in a treatise on copyright, it would be irresponsible not to devote a substantial amount of time to the issues that are of the most obvious importance, as judged by the number of cases that are out there. There you find there is nothing truly spectacular about jurisdiction in copyright cases. Copyright really is determined by general jurisdictional issues; for example, because there is no national service of process in copyright cases, jurisdiction is determined by state law. Subject matter jurisdiction, of course, is federal.

So I had very long discussions because those are the issues copyright lawyers are going to be dealing with, and many copyright lawyers who are specialists don’t take the time to understand general jurisdictional law. And for that, they can get creamed by people who do, and certainly by judges, who handle jurisdictional issues every single day of the week. So I wanted to provide a resource by which copyright lawyers who may not spend too much time on jurisdictional issues as others do, could have at their hands really the most recent stuff on general jurisdiction. To me, it was a service to provide for specialists.

Dames: Consistent with that theme of jurisdiction, I want to move to a comment you made on the Patry Copyright Blog about the Sixth Circuit. Typically, when I have looked at copyright issues and copyright cases, a lot of the cases concentrate on the Ninth and Second Circuits. Recently, of course, the Sixth Circuit has been much more active in copyright cases. What do you see at work in the rise of the Sixth Circuit?

Patry: I did another blog today on the Sixth Circuit, in a case involving a very arcane topic: when does copyright renewal vest? It might vest when the renewal term might begin; it might vest at some other time. That’s a pretty arcane topic that involves the country singer Roger Miller, who died in 1992, which happened to be the very year in which [copyright] renewal became automatic. Congress passed – and I was there – a special provision that dealt with authors who die in the 28th year of their copyright, which was what happened to [Miller]. So even as we speak today, I did a posting on the Sixth Circuit.

Why the Sixth Circuit and not the Second Circuit? I’ve been on the phone today with a friend of mine who is a Second Circuit judge and he certainly had some of the great, sexy fair use cases. He hasn’t had a copyright case in a long time. I think there has been fewer cases going up to the Second Circuit, but the Ninth Circuit continues to have a lot. The Sixth Circuit, of course, has Tennessee, but there have also been a lot of architecture cases within the circuit. Perhaps there has been more activity in the housing market in the area covered by the Sixth Circuit, than the Second Circuit. That wouldn’t surprise me because we’re fairly built out here [in the states covered by the Second Circuit, which are New York, Connecticut, and Vermont].

Of the Sixth Circuit cases, they fall into two categories: architecture cases, and music cases coming from Nashville. The Nashville cases, I think, can be explained this way: Bridgeport Music filed 200 [to] 300 infringement cases over sampling in the Middle District of Tennessee. So I think many of the cases from the Sixth Circuit have involved just one plaintiff. I would expect over time we’ll see a sort of bell curve there, and as soon as the Bridgeport cases finally wind down, the Sixth Circuit probably won’t have as many [cases] as they do. Certainly, if you were to look at the list of Sixth Circuit cases, you’d find a disproportionate amount with that one plaintiff. [Ed.: Law professor Tim Wu profiled Bridgeport Music in 2006 for Slate.]

Dames: And speaking of the Bridgeport cases, do you think those cases have been fairly decided?

Patry: I don’t know what “fairly decided” means, because I wasn’t involved in them. In terms of factual outcomes, I wouldn’t know. The one case I and others have taken extreme exception to is the one in which the court announced there was no de minimis threshold for sampling of sound recordings. That, I thought – and still think – was one of the most wrongly decided cases in the history of copyright law. That [case], I just don’t get. [Ed.: The case is Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005), in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court and held that a two-second, looped sample of a screeching guitar from the Funkadelic record “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” constituted copyright infringement.]

Dames: Do you think that case would cause a substantive enough split in the circuits that it might get addressed in the Supreme Court level?

Patry: Well, it didn’t. Whether it does in the future, I don’t know. If the case came up in any other circuit, I’d be surprised if any circuit went along with it. You could say that was sort of a lark or an anomaly. I certainly pray that it is an anomaly. But the difficulty at the commercial level is that it is the law in the Sixth Circuit, and it’s very easy to bring a case there. So the effect of it is that while it’s not the law in any other circuit, as a commercial matter, [the decision] has really a tremendous influence in providing leverage for people who claim that any sampled use – regardless of how de minimis it may be – requires a license.

Dames: How did your position as senior copyright counsel at Google come about?

Patry: I actually started in October 2006, right before the YouTube deal. I [had] been in private practice for 12 years, in government for eight years, and a law professor for five years. I had never been in-house. Google has tremendous issues; they attempt to think things through, I think, in a responsible, interesting way, and they’re at the cutting edge of a lot of stuff that’s going on. It’s a very exciting company; it’s a very young company, not just in terms of having been around for only a little more than eight years, but in terms of the median age of the people who work there.

For someone like me, I always want to be challenged. I don’t want to ride off into the sunset on an old, broken down pony. With five-and-a-half year-old twins, I’d rather be challenged every day. So the best place to be challenged every day is at a place that’s challenging. They have a New York office, and I wanted to stay in New York. That’s how it came about.

Dames: What is the chance that a portion or all of the treatise will be made available on Google Book Search?

Patry: It would be great to put it on Google Book Search. I’m hoping the whole thing will be on Google Book Search available for searching. What you can pull up [will be a] matter of contract between West and Google. But I’m certainly working on that, and I would like it to occur. I’m doing everything I can to make sure it does occur.

Searching online is not the way I would do things; I happen to have Acrobat files of the book, so I would probably search it that way. But I actually may use Google Book Search myself. For example, if I recall that I referred to somebody, it may be faster for me to do it on Google Book Search if the search covers the entire book in one swoop rather than the way some of the search engines are set up for the walled-off [subscription-based] legal services, where you’re searching by chapter or searching by section. That’s inefficient. So, if I’m able to search the entire book, then I may actually use it myself for those purposes, and others may too. In the end, what I want to do is provide the book in as many formats as I can so people who research things differently than I do, or [research] for different purposes, can do it too.

I’d like for it to be in as many media [as possible], and I’d like for it to be interactive; that’s why I have the separate blog for it. I’m not comfortable with the idea of a single authoritative figure who sort of lays out what the law is. I want it to be more cooperative and interactive because copyright law is enormous. There are people in the trenches everyday digging into issues in greater detail than I ever possibly could, and I’ll learn from them. But I won’t learn from them if I don’t set up a medium in which they can talk to me.

Dames: One of the challenges that Google is facing, of course, is the Google Book Search litigation. Where are we in the litigation process?

Patry: It’s still in the discovery phase; it’s not in the motion phase. There have been, of course, discussions about how to deal with this in a business way. Marissa Mayer [Google’s vice president for search products and user experience] … regard[s] it as a business matter that’s being addressed in a number of different fora. From the published accounts of things, people want to work things out.

Certainly, the other thing to keep in mind is that the publishers who have sued Google at the same time have deals going on with Google. It’s not like an ordinary litigation, where there are strangers trying to work things out in some way. We have ongoing deals with the very same people who, for this different service, are suing us.

And 95-plus percent of all litigation is resolved before trial. There’s that factor.

[Ed.: Google and the plaintiffs in the lawsuit have a proposed settlement pending. For authors whose books were published prior to January 1, 2009, the date to opt out of the settlement is Friday, September 4, 2009. A federal court judge will hold a Final Fairness Hearing on the proposed settlement on Wednesday, October 7, 2009. Details about the opt out date and Final Fairness Hearing are available at the Google Book Search administration site.]

Dames: I did want to ask you your opinion about a case that is a continuation of the term extension and public domain areas: the Kahle v. Gonzales case that was decided at the end of January [2007]. Do you think that case was correctly decided, and what is the continuing effect on the public domain based upon this litigation?

Patry: I heard the oral argument in the case, and I’ve read the opinion. The issue that the plaintiffs were advancing is “What is the correct standard of review?” That’s what the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was deciding, at least at plaintiff’s request.

[Ed.: Two archives asked federal courts to determine the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) was unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument. The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion in the case in May 2007 at 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007).]

The plaintiffs wanted to go back to the trial court and have legislation reviewed under a particular First Amendment standard. And the Court of Appeals said, “Well, we’re not sure that’s not the right standard because this isn’t a First Amendment case. This is a copyright case. So, we’ll take you on the merits and say ‘The argument that you made is the same argument that was made in the Eldred [case],” and rejected it. The Ninth Circuit’s view was that the First Amendment argument wasn’t the appropriate standard of review, but even if it was, it was going to say that the Supreme Court has already addressed this [in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the 2003 Supreme Court decision that held the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act was a constitutional extension of term to life of the author plus 75 years]. So, it effectively said to the plaintiffs “You lose: you don’t get to make your arguments again at the lower, trial court.”

From a policy standpoint, I think the duration of copyright is way too long. Whether “life plus 50 [years]” was correct or not I think can only be answered by taking into account what we got internationally. [Ed.: Before Congress passed the Copyright Term Extension Act, P.L. 105-298, the basic copyright term in the Copyright Act of 1976 was life of the author plus 50 years. Currently, the core copyright term is life of the author plus 70 years.] There was never an argument that “life plus 50” was required to give adequate incentive; “life plus 50” had been the standard in the Berne Convention for some period of time, and the idea of shifting to that in the [Copyright Act of 1976] was … because it benefited us overseas. If I had the ability to write the copyright laws myself, I would probably make the term life of the author and that’s it. I think the [current] term is way too long from a policy standpoint.

Dames: In a post on The Patry Copyright Blog [in Fall 2006], you talked about the trade process, the U.S. Trade Representative, and what seems to be the increasing frequency through which copyright law is bartered. You came out very strongly against this trend. How did this trend get started and what’s the danger in continuing it?

Patry: I’m not alone in feeling strongly about this. I was down in Washington visiting with some friends who are Congressional staffers, and whom I used to work with. And they were telling me that there had been a big blowup over an immigration issue where the concern was that the [Bush] administration was committing the United States to obligations under treaties, and then coming back to Congress and saying, “Now you have to pass [this legislation], because if you don’t, then we’re going to be in violation of our treaty agreements.”

So the issue extends quite beyond copyright; it extends to other areas of law, too. Those who are upset about it, of course, are those who believe that Congress is a co-equal branch of government, and that where important policies are being made, they should be made deliberately – and deliberatively – and with the fullness of time and public vetting.

For example, if you were to try to decide whether or not the United States should enter into a broadcast treaty that gives broadcasters certain rights, there’s a number of ways that could come about. One way would be that the administration – and it could be any administration; I don’t want to single out the [Bush] administration, because the Clinton administration did the same thing at one point – could use its role as the exclusive arbiter of foreign relations and sign a treaty that obligated the United States to do certain things. It wouldn’t even have to be a treaty; it could be a trade agreement, or some sort of a diplomatic document which obligates us to do “X.”

If you don’t have to change domestic law to do “X,” then that’s fine. And those are great treaties for any country to sign. We could sign a treaty where our laws wouldn’t have to be changed, but other countries’ laws do. That would be a win for us, and maybe a loss for the other side. If you can do that, great: you’re a wonderful negotiator.

However, if the agreement you enter into as the executive branch of government obligates a change in domestic law, under our system of government – which is non-parliamentarian – that is the sole province of the legislative branch. And the legislative branch should be able to make that determination free of a situation where we’re already obligated to do it. That’s not the way to agree to things. In people’s personal relationships, it usually doesn’t work out that way: “Honey, I went out and bought a house.” Well, maybe you should have asked me first. The same thing happens with legislation.

So, that’s my objection: this practice is non-democratic. And certainly, when the administration is negotiating with other governments, those of us in the public who’ll be impacted by that [legislation] aren’t at the table. We haven’t had the chance to lobby Congress; we haven’t had a chance to have our voices heard. That’s my real concern: what this trend does as a corrosive factor in democracy.

And it’s not for nothing that these steps are usually taken for legislation that is fairly controversial. After all, if you could go the usual route, you would do it. It’s only when there are issues and problems that democracy is usually sidestepped. There are exceptions, of course: lack of time, for example. You can come up with other scenarios that would justify that taking these actions which aren’t some deep conspiracy against democracy. But I would say I haven’t come across that in the copyright field yet.

Dames: If you’ve been writing Patry on Copyright for seven years, then you started approximately in 1999 or 2000. You have been writing this treatise within the context of the growth of participatory networks and their tools, such as blogs, wikis and instant messaging. To what extent did this evolution inform the writing of the treatise, and how do you anticipate that it is going to inform future editions of the treatise?

Patry: I’d say it impacted on it substantially. Aside from what you want a copyright treatise to say, an important issue is what you want a treatise to be. And currently, I think we’re in flux because there are so many other forms in which people can exchange ideas and information that are quicker, that take into account more community-based thinking or discussions about things. Certainly, online, you can link to other materials and people who have writings you’re writing about with whom you agree or not agree. On the Westlaw and Lexis services, you can link to materials that are within that closed network, of course, but once you’re doing research on the Net as an open platform, the amount of material you can link to, and provide people with references to, is much larger.

Also, the type of research that you’re able to do is different. Most legal research by law professors still is of the traditional sort. There are law professors who blog, and there are a lot of law professors who put things up on SSRN. [Ed.: Social Science Research Network (SSRN) is a Web site devoted to making available scholarly research in the social sciences and humanities. According to a 2008 profile in The New York Times, SSRN’s collections and influence are strongest in economics and law.] Jack Balkin, who [writes] Balknization, did an interview with Yale Law [Report] about the effect of blogging on legal research. He says that the younger law professors are probably more willing to do this sort of stuff, although blogging clearly doesn’t count toward tenure, so I would probably [limit] his statement to the younger law professors with tenure. Those without tenure are still probably going to be going the traditional route. So the legal academy, I think, still views [blogging] as a form of journalism or as a form of informal networking.

But, it does change the type of resources that you can use. For example, in my book I use Wikipedia a lot. I have a lot of quotes from Wikipedia that have discussions of the people who were involved in cases. … One of the reasons I retooled the book, and it took me so long [to release], is take into account those sort of resources that are now available. I hope it makes the book a richer resource than it would have been, but it certainly makes it a different resource than traditional treatises are. So for me, it has had a dramatic impact on both the substance of the book and how I look at things.

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Technorati Tags: Copycense, K. Matthew Dames, William Patry

Normally, this post would be something best left to someone like William Patry, whose credentials on copyright are above reproach. Lawrence Lessig has responded to Helprin in a contemporary and ingenious way, but Lessig’s main focus now has moved from intellectual property matters to what he has called “corruption” (and what Harvard Law School, his new employer calls “a major five-year project examining what happens when public institutions depend on money from sources that may be affected by the work of those institutions”).

We are nowhere near the orbit of either Patry or Lessig when it comes to issues of copyright theory and history. We do think, however, we have some reasonable ideas and knowledge about the American copyright system and its increasing imbalance. And consistent with the the expectations the public should have of scholars and journalists, we don’t just spew: we back up our assertions with the best information we have available at the time.

Therefore, since Patry and Lessig are doing other things, we feel obliged to address Mark Helprin’s of editorials on the U.S. copyright system, the most recent of which was published in the May 11 edition of the Wall Street Journal.

Deconstructing the Myth of Romantic Authorship

Helprin’s views on copyright have been getting a lot of publicity lately. Conveniently, his views on copyright coincide with the release of a new book he has to promote, one that purportedly is about American copyright. The book, entitled Digital Barbarism: A Writer’s Manifesto, has been described by The Wall Street Journal in a review as an argument for copyright’s perpetuity. Interestingly, the WSJ review (written by the executive vice president of News Corp., the Journal’s publisher) is entitled “Hands Off, It’s Mine.” This title is important, and we’ll return to it in a moment.

Helprin first introduced his view of the American copyright system two years ago, in a New York Times editorial. Entitled (at least in the Times‘ online edition) “A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn’t Its Copyright?”, Helprin argues in favor of endless copyright (or as the late MPAA president Jack Valenti would have put it, at least “forever less a day”):

The genius of the framers in making [the Constitution’s limiting clause “for limited Times”] is that it allows for infinite adjustment. Congress is free to extend at will the term of copyright. It last did so in 1998, and should do so again, as far as it can throw. Would it not be just and fair for those who try to extract a living from the uncertain arts of writing and composing to be freed from a form of confiscation not visited upon anyone else? The answer is obvious, and transcends even justice. No good case exists for the inequality of real and intellectual property, because no good case can exist for treating with special disfavor the work of the spirit and the mind.

The argument Helprin makes is consistent with a construct copyright scholars refer to as the “Romantic author,” which itself is related to theories of authorship. Authorship is central to copyright law: the U.S. Constitution grants “to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective writings and discoveries.” Authorship also is relevant in contemporary, statutory copyright law: while the current Act fails to define what an author is, other parts of the Act refer to the author as the initial copyright owner. (As a practical matter, ownership of one or more rights in a copyright usually ends up with a person or entity other than the author.)

The Romantic Author theory essentially claims that authorial rights exist in law because authors naturally have a right in their work the moment it is created, that an Author is worthy of such rights, and it is righteous, ethical and just for the Author to have such a connection (creatively and legally) between him and his work. Additionally, the theory claims an author should be allowed a wide (and perhaps even endless) term to earn money from his protected work to the extent that he can claim sole credit for the work’s creation.

The Romantic Author theory focuses intently on the individual for two reasons: first, the Author is considered to be a privileged individual; second, the creative activity of Authorship is considered to be separate, discrete, and solitary instead of collaborative, cumulative, or derivative. To this end, the Author is considered to develop his creations in nearly complete isolation, without any external influences or inspiration. Within his creative cocoon, he is able to (perhaps even entitled to) be known as the ultimate source of text.

Even though a related thread of this narrative involves viewing authors as craftsmen – a characterization that seems to dampen the emphasis on creative and intellectual genius – that thread still allows for a set of circumstances where by hard work melds with tradition and divine inspiration. Even this slightly less glamorous thread of the Romantic Author narrative continues to allow for a direct connection between divine inspiration and the resulting words on the page.

While appealing, however, the construct of the Romantic Author is false. For example, Texas law professor Oren Bracha argues persuasively in a 2008 journal article that ascribing the entirety of the U.S. copyright regime exclusively to a Romantic Authorship narrative not only is too simple, but it is historically inaccurate. Peter Jaszi, both on his own and in collaboration with Martha Woodmansee, has shown that the Romantic Authorship trope – while false – still has become an active and destabilizing force in copyright doctrine and policy.

Northwestern law professor Olufunmilayo Arewa has written extensively about the ethos of collaboration and borrowing in the creative process (including in classical music), and Georgetown law professor Julie Cohen has discussed the dynamic interactions (.pdf) between individual creators and social and cultural patterns as the root of authorship.

Even French philosophers such as Michel Foucault (.pdf) and Roland Barthes (.pdf) essentially have questioned the premise of the author as solitary genius — no insignificant question given that both men come from a country that takes authorship genius (as manifested through the concept of droit moral) to a far greater degree than exists under U.S. law. In the end, the “mine” that Helprin wants to champion really is more like an “ours,” since virtually every creation will be derived from something else. (In fact, one could make a reasonable argument that the default nature of authorship in a digitally networked society is not the mix, but instead the remix.)

There is also an irony in the authorship construct that Helprin promotes. If one assumes that an individual’s creativity is king, then it would play a larger role in contemporary copyright law than it actually does. A person’s work qualifies to receive copyright protection once he creates something original, then fixes it in some recording that can be perceived by another person. The level of original creativity that U.S. law requires, however, is relatively slight. Helprin suggests every piece of writing is a War and Peace in the making, and thus the law should go to the extreme to protect such creative epics. But the fact is that American law does not require the proverbial opus: according to the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340 (1991), “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”

Influencing Copyright Law & Policy

Helprin’s views about a certain class of copyright lobbyists are more easily dismissed. In the May 11 WSJ editorial, Helprin sharply attacks organizations he considers to be anti-copyright (and by extension, perhaps also against creativity):

But copyright, the rampart of the mythical city, is besieged by a widespread movement antagonistic to authorial right and the legitimacy of intellectual property. So-called public interest groups serve the new information super powers, the Standard Oils of our age, whose interests would be advanced if they did not have to bother with permissions and payments for what they call “content.” The Creative Commons organization, for example, is richly financed by Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Mozilla, Sun, the Hewlett Foundation, and others of type.

The opponents of copyright are no more disinterested than its defenders, although they do a good job of pretending, and their theories have become the window dressing for the piracy of software, music, movies — and soon the written word. They may claim that they are not against copyright per se. But if, as they repeatedly assert, copyright is an unjustifiable tax, a monopoly, and a bar to creativity, why wouldn’t they or anyone else be against it, as in fact they are?

Specifically as to Creative Commons, we have said before that our problem with the entire CC concept is that it moves copyright issues into the realm of contract law instead repairing their federal statutory and political bases. The flip side is that if the current copyright system was in its proper, Constitutionally-mandated balance, it is possible there would be no need for organizations like Creative Commons, or Electronic Frontier Foundation, or Public Knowledge.

To this end, Helprin’s argument sounds suspiciously like Republicans who now whine they have no political organizations to represent their views like the Democratic-oriented Center for American Progress, all the while forgetting they spent years building and funding organizations like the Heritage Foundation.

Since Helprin apparently is new to the copyright game, perhaps we can forgive his ignorance for not realizing that RIAA, MPAA, BSA, IIPA and lobbyists for various other corporate copyright portfolio owners not only are well-funded and organized, but long have been the exclusive arbiters of U.S. and international copyright law and policy, as both Jessica Litman and William Patry have noted. Interestingly, none of those lobbying organizations have authors’ or creators’ best interests in mind. Sure, their marketing and political rhetoric is quick to mention the author (in all her Romantic glory) and their protection of her art. In actuality, however, those lobbyists mention the author or creator merely to humanize their true clients: multinational corporations whose revenues, profits, expense account sizes, and share prices all depend on licensing one or more of the six rights a copyright owner receives under the 1976 Act.

Of course, the only way the corporations can do this is to actually own the rights in the first place, thereby divesting that same author or creator of the legal or economic power that arises from her creation. In reality, copyright ownership in the U.S. is often a zero-sum game: the authors get zero, and corporate owners get the sum. Helprin cannot reasonably refute this.

Again, we can excuse Helprin’s ignorance of the industrial and legal realities: copyright, unfortunately and after all, is complicated. There is no excuse, however, for patently misrepresenting the policy positions or the missions of the organizations he has chosen to attack. Some of us at Copycense have been involved in copyright matters going back more than a decade from the legal and political standpoint, and for more than 30 years from the creative standpoint. At no point have we heard or read anything from EFF, Public Knowledge, Creative Commons, or a similarly situated organization that serves as “the window dressing for ‘piracy.’”

Do we agree with everything these organizations promote? Certainly not, and regular readers know we have said so. But even a cursory glance at their positions would reveal all are in favor of balanced copyright legislation. None of these organizations, however, give any credence to Helprin’s tight embrace of the Romantic Authorship construct. Unfortunately for him, neither does the history of copyright law, either in the U.S. or in England.

We have no problem with accepting new voices into the copyright debate. Indeed, it is the absence of new voices and new ideas that has led us to the imbalance that exists. But all new voices should be required to perform some basic research and due diligence before opining so publicly about the state of the copyright world. At least based upon his editorials, Helprin clearly has not.

Copycense on Twitter: twitter.com/copycense

Technorati Tags: authorship, Copycense, Lawrence Lessig, Mark Helprin, William Patry

Copycense and its executive editor, K. Matthew Dames, have been noted by The New York Times’ Freakonomics blog for our two-year coverage of the misuse of the term “piracy” in connection with intellectual property. The Freakonomics blog also cites Dames’ working paper of the history of the term piracy, both in the English language and in American legal usage.

Related:

- Freakonomics blog (The New York Times). Pirates Steal Ships, Not Songs. April 23, 2009.

- K. Matthew Dames. The Etymology of Piracy (working paper). SSRN. April 21, 2009.

- Copycense. Dismantling the Frame of Piracy. April 18, 2007.

- K. Matthew Dames. Framing the Copyright Debate. Information Today. September 2006.

Copycense is on Twitter: http://twitter.com/copycense

Technorati Tags: Copycense, framing & rhetoric, Freakonomics blog, K. Matthew Dames, piracy, The New York Times

We saw today on the Creative Generalist blog a post about a film entitled Rip! A Remix Manifesto. The film, according to the Open Source Cinema Web site, is “an open source documentary about copyright and remix culture. Created over a period of six years, the film features the collaborative remix work of hundreds of people who have contributed to this website, helping to create the world’s first open source documentary.”

The film debuts March 15 at the South by Southwest film festival, but its trailer is available now.

The film’s protagonist is Gregg Gillis, the personality behind the one man sample band Girl Talk. Gillis has become the poster child for fair use lately: Gillis also was a protagonist in another fair use documentary entitled Good Copy, Bad Copy, which was released in 2007. We want to use this piece to probe Girl Talk’s role in the policy debate about copyright, technology, and fair use.

Reviewing Girl Talk’s Work

Gillis’s Girl Talk has released three “mashup” albums on the provocatively named recording label Illegal Art, including Feed the Animals. “Animals” is available from Illegal Art as a “pay what you want” download, but the album also is available from mainstream retail outlets including Amazon.com. We purchased a CD version of “Animals” from a local record store. (For more information about why Copycense doesn’t do downloads, read the April 2008 piece The Downside of Downloads.)

Gillis has evolved into that oxymoron known as the underground music celebrity, with all the requisite things that come with it, including profiles in The Washington Post, The New York Times and the Times Magazine; and Wired. (Wired seemingly has hitched itself to the Gillis train, giving him a Rave Award in 2007 and lots of other ink, including a sample analysis and an analysis of his business model.) Idolator has devoted at least two pieces to Girl Talk, allowing Gillis to maintain “street cred” and an overall aura of mysterious grunge, even as he grows into a full-scale enterprise brand. (Neither Gillis nor his performing alter ego throw off anywhere near the enigmatic shroud that seems to envelop Danger Mouse, whose sample opus The Grey Album I’ll return to.)

Turning to our inner music critic, we consider the Girl Talk albums to be nice, non-intrusive pop albums. We can listen to some of the singles more than once, and we appreciate the imagination and editing work that go into crafting each of the singles. But when compared to other sample albums (see Madlib’s “Beat Konducta” series; virtually anything by the late J Dilla; Prince Paul’s Handsome Boy Modeling School adventures; the Spectoresque wall of samples presented in the early Public Enemy albums; or even Danger Mouse’s aforementioned Grey Album), the Girl Talk works are tame.

To put it another way, at no time did we listen to Girl Talk’s work and shake our head in amazement (or better yet, turn off the stereo in quasi disgust because we realized we’d just heard genius and never could approach it — which we have done with work by Dilla and Madlib). For us, the best sample albums are those that are orchestrated meticulously like a Gil Evans arrangement. They are a roux of sounds, tones, notes in between notes, and a guttural “boom bap,” rather than compilations that club you over the head with the obvious.

But, we’re not mad at Gillis; he does what he does, and he does it capably. For that we say “vaya con Dios.”

GirlTalk’s Role in the Copyright Policy Debate

What interests us more about Gillis and his sonic adventures, though, is his ascension to the throne of fair use martyrdom. I have no idea whether or not Gillis seeks this position, but I would be shocked to know that he is unaware of this role bestowed upon him. Indeed, if the Rip! trailer is any indication, Gillis seems to revel in at least the rogue role, which allows him to “put [Elton John’s music] into a headlock” and, to date, not face any legal or economic consequences. To this end, part of his business model involves casting himself as a villanous (albeit not too threatening) copyfighter who is willing to playing a game of statutory chicken with the music labels from whose records he has culled his considerable sample list, all while writhing nearly naked on a concert hall stage near you.

Thus far, the labels have layed down and done nothing — an unusual move for an industry that never met a lawsuit it didn’t like.

In light of the current, overheated copyright environment, judicial decisions in cases like Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) and Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005), and (for heaven’s sake) FBI raids targeting mixtape creators and distributors, we must ask this question:

Why hasn’t Gregg Gillis been forced to post bail yet?

Copycense challenges anyone with any skin in the copyright game — artists, musicians, lawyers, academics, journalists, policy wonks, lobbyists — to give us one credible reason why Gillis has not had to sign for his personal belongings after being processed, or had an individual approach his home and hand him a set of papers with those dreaded three words: “You’ve been served.”

We’ll post any credible analysis in full on Copycense. We don’t have to agree with the rationale or the conclusions, but anyone who responds to our offer must pose a strong argument. And to help everyone get on the same page, we consider the following to be weak arguments:

1. “Those cases don’t really apply to GirlTalk because he doesn’t use any of their works [or the cases’ holdings apply narrowly to the Second and Sixth Circuits, respectively].” Come on, now. If you’ve read anything on Copycense prior to this, you’re better than that. If you’ve not read Copycense before now, there’s a lot to catch up on.

2. “Madlib, Dilla and Danger Mouse have not been arrested or sued for copyright infringement for their sample albums.” True, but Danger Mouse did receive a “cease and desist” letter — the precursor to an infringement lawsuit — from the Beatles’ record label. Dilla’s sample opus Donuts was released posthumously, and its proceeds are going to his estate in part to support his mother; it would have made for poor publicity to sue a beloved dead producer. And no other sample artist has has (or has had) a public profile approaching that of Gillis and Girl Talk. Further, one could argue reasonably that a sizable portion of the samples that Dilla used and Madlib uses are virtually unrecognizable (whether they’ve been used natively or transformed) to the vast majority of the American populace. In contrast, almost every sample Girl Talk uses is taken from some readily identifiable popular music anthem.

Here’s the Copycense theory. Gillis hasn’t been arrested or sued because his socioeconomic status fits what the mainstream wants to see when it talks about this issue. Gillis’ bio reads well for mainstream public relations purposes — he is white, middle-class, and educated — and his basic story (fell in love with music and sampling while studying science at a renown institution of higher learning) is All-American. For establishment folks like Congressman Mike Doyle (D-PA), who represents the district in which Gillis resides and has testified before Congress on Gillis’ behalf, Gillis’ story presents a squeaky clean image of American innovation — and decidedly not sepia-toned humans toiling against misery in dark, sweaty, basements or ghetto community rooms where sampling and hip hop culture were born out of the need to get by with less.

And here are our problems with this scenario. First, it legitimizes Gillis’ work in ways that do not benefit other sampling artists, particularly artists of color. If Gillis gets praised in the halls of Congress, yet DJ Drama must worry about federal agents ransacking his studio for performing essentially the same activity, our society is implying that sampling is illegal, rogue, and legally actionable until a white biomedical engineer does it (at which time the activity is transformed into yet another sign of American ingenuity).

Second, this portrayal diminishes the contributions of all artists because it elevates the “genius” of Gillis’ mashup over the source materials. This concept took root for us when we listened to jazz musician and educator T.S. Monk discuss sampling on a 2008 Future of Music Coalition panel entitled Creative License.

We don’t agree with all the arguments Monk promoted while on the panel. For example, his conception of copyright seems to be based upon a notion of singular, unique, and Romantic authorship that we reject. Also, Monk’s opinion that the work of composer Irving Berlin should never fall into the public domain because of its uniqueness and value to American society are views we never could share because we believe all work should fall into the public domain sooner than the current “life plus 70″ law we have now. (Appropriately, we think “life plus 70″ sounds like a prison sentence.) We’re all for Irving Berlin earning from his work; we’re not for Irving Berlin’s estate forever contending that it is owed residuals from Berlin’s work merely by virtue of filial relations.

Artistry and Creation

Still, other of Monk’s comments about the forgotten role of the African-American artist in the sample game are relevant to the instant discussion. During the Creative License panel, Monk told a story about being sent away to attend boarding school in Darien, Connecticut in the early sixties, and the community’s response to a fatal car accident that killed a number of the community’s white students, whom authorities later found were smoking marijuana. “It was at that point that America and the media said, ‘Oh, this drug thing that’s been a problem in the African-American community has now hit the suburbs,” Monk said. “We got a problem.”

Monk’s argued that just as the drug addiction issue seemed to be ignored by most of American society until it seeped out of communities of color and into white, mainstream communities, so too the copyright policy issues wrought by digital sampling have been of little consequence to mainstream America until it began to affect white, mainstream artists like Gregg Gillis. We believe he has an important and valid point.

Few mainstream voices have mentioned the names of sampling artists such as Madlib, Dilla, Prince Paul, Pete Rock, RZA, Ali Shaheed Muhammad or DJ Premier in this debate because (a) they don’t know them; (b) they don’t know their work; (c) they can’t identify the samples these cats have been chopping up for decades; and (d) none of them fall into a socioeconomic demographic that the mainstream values as having a legitimate voice or expression. (To be fair, Public Enemy sonic architect Hank Shocklee, who is African-American, fortunately has been a frequent [WinMedia] and articulate voice in the sampling debate.)

But the policy issues that are inherent in sampling are just as germane to Madlib, Dilla, and RZA as they are to Gillis. The same Congressional testimony that supports Gillis’ use of music samples as a shining example of American ingenuity should apply to the work of artists of color who have been flipping beats for a longer period of time, and arguably doing so in much more ingenious ways.

Monk’s comments on the Future of Music panel also brought into focus the role of the African-American artists as the creative source behind the sampled musical compositions. In addition to arguing that the policy issues in sampling didn’t matter until they affected a white, mainstream sampler, Monk also argued that the sampled music itself never was seen as a problem until mainstream white artists’ work became the source of the samples.

“Just as you had with the drugs, you had [with the digital sampler] a generation of young African-Americans who had been deprived of music education, even though they were at the end of an incredibly rich musical legacy,” Monk commented. “… I remember the first kid I saw standing on the block [in the early eighties]; he’s a human beat box. And I knew he needed a drum kit; he wanted to play some drums, but there were no drums. So he was making due.”

“Then someone says ‘Man, that little two beat piece of James Brown — man, I could loop that …’ The kids didn’t know [the legal ramifications of sampling] because they didn’t understand exactly what they were doing. But the people upstairs knew on day one that we had copyright infringement issues here,” Monk continued. ” … Being [Thelonius] Monk’s son, and having grown up in a house with Miles [Davis], and Dizzy Gillespie, and John Coltrane and all these guys, I know about the rip off. And I know a lot of the rip-off had to do with the fact that these African-American musicians did not have the resources for redress. Nobody was running around sampling Pat Boone [in the early eighties]. This was African-American music. … And somebody upstairs said on day one, ‘Hey main, ain’t nobody gonna sue us. Let’s do it. Let’s see.’ … That’s where it all started.”

Hence, we have the 1991 decision in Grand Upright — which is widely regarded as the first legal decision in American jurisprudence to address illegality in digital sampling — and Judge Duffy’s Exodus admonition that “Thou shalt not steal.” If Biz Markie cannot “steal,” why can Girl Talk?

Conclusion

Like we said above, we’re not mad at Gillis. He seems to have carved out a nice little enterprise for himself. As the kids often say “Don’t hate the player, hate the game.”

This essay explains why we love and support copyright, but hate elements of the game it has become. For Gillis to have avoided legal action this long for producing, distributing, performing and profiting from work that reasonably can be found to be a mass copyright infringement — “piracy” if you will — raises tremendous policy issues about the confluence copyright law and policy, technology, and how artists of color have been treated (or mistreated) in this arena. As we address the copyright policy issues surrounding sampling — a practice that, with hip hop, grew and evolved from artists of color “making due” — we must also address longstanding issues concerning the work of artists of color under the same legal regime.

Copycense™: Incisive IP.™

Technorati Tags: copyright, Girl Talk, Gregg Gillis, Hank Shocklee, J Dilla, Madlib, T.S. Monk

Last week, the Associated Press issued several DMCA takedown notices on a Web site called Workbench, claiming the site had infringed its copyright when it posted ledes and titles from a handful of AP stories. The Associated Press, which is a cooperative owned by more than 1,000 newspapers, which contribute content to the collective and use content from it. I am intimately familiar with the AP and how it works, and think that the cooperative has evolved into an influential, primary news organization because so many newspapers have abandoned original reporting in so many areas due to real or perceived financial pressures.

(Next time you read your local newspaper, take notice of how many stories are wire service stories from AP, Reuters, Agence France Presse, or a similar agency.)

AP’s tactics, however, raise some interesting issues about copyright’s use and applicability in a networked information environment, where virtually every action invokes one of the six exclusive rights.

I address these issues in no particular order.

1. The DMCA Takedown Process: I’ll address both sides of the same coin. The first side is an opinion many hold: “The DMCA takedown process is flawed and must be amended.” The safe harbor provisions under Section 512 allow a “service provider” to avoid infringement liability so long as the “service provider” removes or disables access to the allegedly infringing content upon being served with the takedown notice. As Wendy Seltzer illustrated last year, the takedown provisions do not provide for any assessment of fair use (or any other copyright exception), and provide weak safeguards against abuse. (For example, retailers like WalMart abuse the process every Thanksgiving holiday by issuing takedown notices for holiday sales information that, by any reasonable measure, is factual — and therefore not subject to copyright protection.)

The flip side is equally compelling, yet not quite as popular: “Service providers should not roll over reflexively and accept such DMCA notices without investigation.” Granted, there are costs associated to training staff to handle these notices properly, but those are fixed costs that come with this particular business. An ISP would have to train its staff to handle any sort of legal notice, including a subpoena, so DMCA notification training should not be an issue.

(See Section 512(k)(1) for a definition of “service provider.”)

Further, I see nothing in the takedown procedures that requires any sort of investigation into the paper’s validity or credence, and a strict reading of the statute may prohibit such an investigation … so long as the “service provider” is satisfied simply to comply with the DMCA and punt on any extralegal responsibility it may have to its customers. My reading of this tortuously long statute indicates that it “service providers” are required to expeditiously remove, or disable access to allegedly infringing material in order to qualify for the “safe harbor.” Absent qualifying for the safe harbor, I see nothing that requires “service providers” to expeditiously remove, or disable access to allegedly infringing material.

What is the worst that could happen if a “service provider” decided to question the takedown process, and in the process disqualify itself for the “safe harbor”? It gets sued for copyright infringement? Surely, no person or entity wants to get sued, but is it too much for ISPs to show a little spine on this issue, especially if the spine showing results in bad press for the copyright owners? (Oddly, bad press for the copyright owners may actually help keep the issue out of the courts. And bad press may be the only effective tactic left in stemming the inexorable march toward narrower interpretations of copyright exceptions that don’t require compensation or permission.)

Besides, an ISP recently showed some spine and objected to some of the DMCA’s provisions: Verizon, for example, litigated the DMCA subpoena provisions … and actually won.

2. The Trial Balloon: Once The New York Times got hold of the story, the Associated Press had retreated from its initial, aggressive actions, calling them “heavy-handed.” The implication is that an overzealous legal department ran amuck without consulting the business side of the building.

This is garbage. The AP knew exactly what it was doing, and the legal department had full sanction from (and was in consultation with) the business side of the building. In fact, I’d go so far as to say that AP did not consider their actions to be “heavy-handed” until the Times inquired about this issue. (It is significant that the Times is a cooperative owner of AP, and also has increased its implementation of blogs in the newsroom and on its Web site.)

This is not an accident at all. The AP wanted to see how aggressive it could get, and for how long, before its actions were (a) noticed by business partners (or at least entities or executives it respects), and (b) questioned or criticized by those partners. AP will use this incident (and the reaction) in the future as a barometer for how aggressive it can be in proscribing uses of its content that are not explicitly licensed. Next, what we’ll likely see is a new AP content license that is promoted specifically for bloggers. Part of the market research for such an initiative, however, is occurring now, with this shot across the bow.

The concept of a content license for bloggers is neither new, nor necessarily negative. But that license will be positioned as an insurance policy: buy the license and we won’t sue; but if you don’t buy the license, then we make no guarantees. It is the proverbial Corleonic proposition.

Implicit in the “no guarantee” part of the equation is AP’s behavior in this situation. When this issue arises in the future, the AP’s rationale will be that while there were no (or fewer) licensing options when AP approached Workbench in June 2008, now (whenever that time in the future is) you have options … in the form of the license. The options won’t be “fair use or some other exception,” “fair use or not fair use,” or even “fair use or license,” but instead “license or risk getting sued.”

I think AP is beta testing future business initiatives (and perhaps stalling for time to get its initiatives together) while using allegations of copyright infringement and the hammer of a lawsuit. This is not the first time a large copyright portfolio has done this: I think the RIAA has done this for years, for example. I think the three academic publishers who sued Georgia State University for alleged infringement via electronic reserves are doing exactly the same thing, under the guise of “protecting authors” and maintaining incentives for future authors to publish.

The problem I see with this tactic is that it narrows attempts to render irrelevant any discussion of the bevy of copyright exceptions that are allowed under the law. Muting discussion of exceptions works consistently with promoting licensing as a solution to avoiding copyright infringement. “Don’t worry about copyright; it’s too complicated. Buy the license and be secure in knowing that you (or your organization) are in compliance,” goes the pitch. What the pitch really is saying though, is “Pay for everything without referring to the copyright exceptions that, under certain circumstances, will allow parties to use, access, reproduce, distribute, or remix portions of protected works without having to ask for permission and without having to pay.” That’s not a solution; that’s a surrender.

Dastardly? Perhaps. Cynical? Maybe. Beyond the realm of possibility in an overheated copyright environment? Absolutely not.

3. Fair Use & the Inverted Pyramid: In the same Times story, writer Saul Hansell reported the following:

Even if The A.P. sets standards, bloggers could choose to use more content than its standards permit, and then The A.P. would have to decide whether to take legal action against them. One important legal test of whether an excerpt exceeds fair use is if it causes financial harm to the copyright owner.

“The principal question is whether the excerpt is a substitute for the story, or some established adaptation of the story,” said Timothy Wu, a professor at the Columbia Law School. Mr. Wu said that the case is not clear-cut, but he believes that The A.P. is likely to lose a court case to assert a claim on that issue.

“It’s hard to see how the Drudge Retort ‘first few lines’ is a substitute for the story,” Mr. Wu said.

Associated Press, obviously, thinks differently. In a June 3 letter to Rogers Cadenhead, Workbench’s editor, the news cooperative’s Intellectual Property Governance Coordinator wrote the following:

… you purport that the Drudge Retort’s users reproduce and display AP headlines and leads under a fair use defense. Please note that contrary to your assertion, AP considers that the Drudge Retort users’ use of AP content does not fall within the parameters of fair use. The use is not fair use simply because the work copied happened to be a news article and that the use is of the headline and the first few sentences only. This is a misunderstanding of the doctrine of “fair use.” AP considers taking the headline and lede of a story without a proper license to be an infringement of its copyrights, and additionally constitutes “hot news” misappropriation.

(By the way, isn’t “Intellectual Property Governance Coordinator” a great title? I would have settled for “IP Majordomo,” but Intellectual Property Governance Coordinator sounds magisterial.)

There is a practical problem with Professor Wu’s statement, and it is connected to Associated Press’s interpretation of fair use: journalists write news stories using a technique called the inverted pyramid. In the inverted pyramid form of writing, a news story’s most substantive, important, and informative information appears near the top of the article, while contextual information falls further down into later paragraphs. Essentially, the inverted pyramid form of writing requires news stories to answer the most important questions — who, what, when, where, how (and set the tone for answering “why”) — within the first three paragraphs. In the tightest news writing, a reader should be able to answer the most important questions in the first 3 to 5 sentences, which include the “lede” (or lead).

The rationale behind the technique is quite sensible: it allows readers with little time a way to be informed quickly, particularly if one is scanning the paper. The technique, which has been around and used for centuries, represents a CNN-style of reporting that existed before Ted Turner even was born.

From a legal perspective, though, one could argue reasonably that the inverted pyramid technique, combined with contemporary blogging practices, has an effect on fair use. If you look at the four-plus factor test in Section 107 and compare it to how news writers construct their stories using the inverted pyramid, the first 3 to 5 lines of a news story essentially constitute factors three (”amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”) and four (”the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”). Said another way, the inverted paragraph form of writing — which includes “the first few lines of a story” that Wu claims could not be a substitute for a story — is a substitute for the story. That what it always has been designed to be. By extension, if online writers are using the first few lines of a news story, and news stories (almost universally) are written in the inverted pyramid format, then online writers that use those lines are substituting for the news story.

Let me take it a step further. If findings for or against fair use are based upon a theory of commercial substitution, then it seems that every use of a news story’s first few lines is, a commercial substitution that finds against fair use. Fair use should not be winnowed down exclusively to commercial substitution, but given Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (”[the fourth factor of Section 107] is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”) and the fair use’ otherwise vague and inaccessible nature, most folks will use commercial substitution as the clearest guideline in an otherwise foggy doctrine. (This is especially true of copyright portfolio owners, because they can argue that virtually any invocation of the exclusive rights rights is (or may be) a commercial substitution, and therefore, beyond the scope of fair use.)

To be fair, William Patry has called “erroneous” the Harper & Row court’s assertion that the fourth factor is “undoubtedly the single most important factor,” but I do not know of any comparable holding that explicitly overturns that analysis, or any trend that suggests federal courts are no longer relying on it.

For these reasons, I see Associated Press’ actions last week as having long-lasting commercial, political, and journalistic importance.

Update (June 23, 2008): In a Friday, June 20 posting to The New York Times’ Bits blog, writer Saul Hansell reported that Associated Press and Workbench editor Roger Cadenhead “consider the matter closed” as of Thursday, June 19. Hansell’s post links to Cadenhead’s reportage about the dispute’s end. Cadenhead’s post, in turn, discusses AP’s use of tracking technologies from a company called Attributor, a Redwood City, Calif. company that has had AP as a client since May 2007. (Interestingly, Cadenhead notes, Attributor posted a blog earlier this year that advised its clients to send a link request instead of a DMCA takedown notice.)

Cadenhead also notes that AP already offers fee-based services whereby customers pay for headlines and lede paragraphs. (We presume Cadenhead is referring to AP Exchange or AP Digital.)

Additionally, Cadenhead also mentioned the willingness of parties like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge to assist his legal fight. Since both organizations seem to choose their issues and legal fights with extreme care, it is fair to say both parties were as interested in the potential for positive publicity as the legal issues.

Finally, Hansell’s report surmises what occurred between AP’s issuance takedown notice of the takedown notices, and the apparent detente late last week. In the end, none of the thorny legal issues got resolved and no one seems to want to discuss the key issues on the record. The veil of silence that surrounds the “settlement” reinforces our conviction that AP was using this issue as a trial balloon, both to gauge public opinion and to use as a test case for future business initiatives.

Copycense™: Incisive IP.™

We missed this story when it appeared last month, so we are commenting on it now.

A woman who was arrested on allegations she sold illegal music compact discs was jailed last month and left by law enforcement authorities in solitary confinement for more than four days. The woman, Adriana Torres-Flores, 38, of Springdale, Arkansas, was left without food, toilet facilities, or sleeping facilities. Torres-Flores said she drank her own urine to for fluids.

Torres-Flores had been arrested in December 2007 on criminal charges she was selling bootlegged compact discs at a Springdale, Arkansas flea market. Torres-Flores faces deportation proceedings because she is not a U.S. citizen.

We discovered news of Ms. Torres-Flores’ situation after we read a The New York Times last week about the bootlegged entertainment that no longer is available on Canal Street, long known as one of New York City’s major distribution points for discount goods, many of which are counterfeit. The story details an initiative Mayor Michael Bloomberg began in December 2003 with the aim of reducing the amount of counterfeit goods in the city that never sleeps.

A separate December 2003 from the Times details the results of an afternoon raid against counterfeit goods.

In both Times stories, the newspaper quotes financial estimates from trade associations — the Motion Picture Association of America in last week’s story; the International Chamber of Commerce in the 2003 story — that purport to detail the amount of money the associations’ member lose to counterfeit or bootlegged goods.

Ms. Torres-Flores’ situation is egregious because of the unusual circumstances surrounding her detention. In many other ways, however, her situation is consistent with an effort by multinational copyright industries to use municipal police to enforce and uphold the protection of their narrow interests. We wrote about this situation last year when editorializing about the Fulton County Sherriff’s involvement (with blue-jacketed representatives from the Recording Industry Association of America) in a raid of DJ Drama’s Atlanta studio.

DJ Drama and several of his colleagues were arrested in January 2007 for making mixtapes allegedly in violation of the Copyright Act of 1976.

See also:

Eric A. Taub. Off New York Streets, Film Piracy Is Online. The New York Times. April 14, 2008.

Mark Minton. Woman Forgotten 4 Days In Tiny Cell. Arkansas Democrat Gazette. March 11, 2008.

Copycense. Mix Tapes Compared to Cocaine? February 7, 2007.

Michael Wilson. 2 Chinatown Stores Raided In Counterfeit-Goods Sweep. The New York Times. Dec. 3, 2003.

Copycense™: Incisive IP.™