Here at Copycense, we have been investigating our editorial and business models in light of several changes in the way we provide information about copyright, content, media, and information policy to our audience, as well as several changes in the way copyright information is made available online. The purpose of this short piece is to apprise our audience of some of the changes we will implement throughout the rest of 2009.

Editorial Changes

Copycense has been in continuous publication since 2004, but we really began reconsidering our approach to analyzing and writing on copyright and information policy issues about a year ago. During the past year, three things have become clear to us. First, we have realized we do not want to fill Copycense with content that has only ephemeral value. Instead, we want the content here to have lasting value.

Second, we have realized there several outlets are much more capable of, and efficient at, publishing daily reports about copyright, intellectual property, and information policy matters.

Third, it has become clear to us that continuing to focus on the daily news events has hampered our ability to view and analyze such events in a global fashion. It also has made it more difficult for us to connect the dots between law, business, technology, creativity, and society, which is what we believe we do best.

In light of these observations, we announce today that Copycense is managing its coverage of news events about copyright and information policy exclusively through our Twitter account at http://twitter.com/copycense and our FriendFeed account at http://friendfeed.com/copycense. Together, the content on these accounts replaces the Copycense Clippings and Site Check features on this site.

Our Twitter feed has been up and running for about 45 days. We have found it works perfectly for managing daily news updates, but we withheld a formal announcement about its presence and purpose until now in order to work out a publication system with which we felt comfortable.

Our FriendFeed feed provides similar information to what we post on Twitter. At first glance, the accounts seem like they are providing duplicate information. There is, however, one important difference between the information on each site: the FriendFeed site lets us explain and contextualize our Twitter posts (or the stories we point to in our Twitter posts) where we feel context is necessary, or we just want to editorialize, while our Twitter site provides mostly pointers to news stories we feel are important, and witty quips about those stories.

One example of how we use FriendFeed is illustrated by our comments about federal injunctions within the context of civil copyright litigation. In a recent Tweet, we linked to a story about a federal judge’s temporary injunction that blocked the publication and continued distribution of an adaptation J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye. On our FriendFeed site, we expounded on federal judges’ willingness to routinely issue injunctive relief in copyright cases even though injunctive relief is supposed to be an extraordinary (and, by extension, relatively infrequently granted) remedy given the standard that is set forth under the Federal Rules.

We also like FriendFeed because it allows to connect to (and post from) other services like Facebook, where we soon will have a full presence.

How does our work on Twitter, FriendFeed, and Facebook affect what we do here here, the main Copycense site? Our work on these external social networking sites means that the work we post here from this point forward will be less frequent, but more expansive and technical. In essence, our social networking sites will provide daily coverage of copyright and information policy issues, while this site will publish some of the scholarly and empirical work our executive editor, K. Matthew Dames, has been conducting recently. This site also will provide a forum for some of the policy work we have been proposing, and connect more tightly with pre-publication papers we post on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN).

With these changes, we anticipate Copycense will serve our existing audience and new readers by continuing to be a reasonable and respected participant in the broader online debate about what copyright is — and what it should be — in a 21st century networked information economy. And it seems that having reasonable voices in the online debate is more important than ever in light of recent changes in the debate’s constituency.

Changes in the Copyright Debate

While we have been mulling these editorial changes, important changes have occurred in the online copyright debate. While copyright has become a citizen’s issue in the United States like never before, the broader debate about copyright has lost some of its most valuable and well-known online contributors. William Patry? Gone. (In truth, Patry occasionally drops tidbits on The Patry Copyright Blog (TPCB), and he graciously restored his archives for all after he had removed the entire blog last fall. But TPCB is effectively shuttered for business.) Patry left the blogosphere in part because he became concerned that journalists (and perhaps even citizens) of all stripes conflated his work on TPCB with official copyright policy positions from Google, for whom works as Senior Copyright Counsel.

Lawrence Lessig? See ya. He has left copyright to focus his attention on “corruption.”

Siva Vaidhyanathan? Adios. He is focusing his attention on Google, and whether Google will, in fact, avoid evil.

We note these three not because we always agreed with their writings, opinions or conclusions. But each of them did write, regularly, and did so in ways that helped remove the layers of mystery that long have shrouded copyright and information policy — layers we believe no longer can exist now that these issue affect John and Jane Doe as much as they do Multinational Conglomerate Inc. Certainly, there are other strong voices that continue to write well and evenly on information policy issues, but many of those other strong voices are lobbyists for rabidly pro-copyright owner organizations (or more specifically, corporate copyright portfolio owners) whose work and “educational” initiatives are presented to preserve business models instead of fostering copyright balance or equality.

Other strong voices call for copyright abolition, or propose licensing alternatives as a way of getting around U.S. copyright law’s current imbalance. In our view, copyright abolition simply is not an option we ever could support, and we never have supported the absence of a copyright system. Despite its flaws, we actually believe rather strongly in the U.S. copyright system; we just don’t believe in an overly strong U.S. copyright system, which is what we have now.

As for licensing initiatives like those proposed by Creative Commons, we believe they provide worthy alternative approaches, but ultimately do little to calibrate our copyright system back to its historical and Constitutionally-mandated balance. In short, if our copyright system was in balance, would we really need Creative Commons? We believe the ultimate goal should be to restore balance to our copyright system so that an initiative like Creative Commons ultimately is unnecessary.

Then there are a handful of strong voices who have “legitimate” platforms who simply do not know what they are talking about because they have failed to get their hands dirty with the theory, history, grist, and marrow of copyright. We count Mark Helprin as a member of this group. Members of this group are dangerous because they have platforms that our society considers legitimate, and because their opinions may carry weight because of their access to such platforms — even though their knowledge of copyright law, theory, and history is embarrassingly scant.

Copycense 3.0

While we are not nearly as prolific or “credentialed” as some of the others who write about copyright and information policy, we are still here. Therefore, we announce now (albeit with some trepidation) that Copycense will step in and try filling the gap left by Patry, Lessig, and others who used to contribute their work, scholarship, and thoughts to the broader online debate about balanced copyright.

We are, however, going to do things a bit differently. We will not try to do what Patry, Lessig, Vaidhyanathan did. Eaach of them are enormous scholars, and we are unsure we could match them. On the other hand, we do not think they could do what we are attempting to do from this point forward: to make copyright, information policy and related issues clear and understandable to the average citizen creator, be it a 7-year-old making a collage, or a 70-year-old creating needlepoint — all while maintaining high standards of academic and journalistic rigor.

In other words, to paraphrase Public Enemy’s Chuck D, we’ll be breaking things down so that those on the boulevard and in the bourgeoisie can understand copyright equally, with our social networking presences serving the citizenry, and Copycense.com serving the academy and political class. Audacious, we know, but we only live once, so why not do it to death while we’re here?

Education is one of the keys to successfully implementing our plans, therefore Copycense will introduce a number of educational initiatives that will help citizens understand copyright and and how it applies to their creative work, professional work, academic work, and daily lives. Copyright once was something that only concerned specialists, entertainment corporations, and lobbyists. Now — with the lower barriers of creative production and distribution wrought by computer power, software packages, and the World Wide Web — copyright arguably is as much a citizen’s issue as a corporate issue. Citizens now have as equal a claim as corporate owners to being copyright stakeholders, yet few citizens truly understand the doctrine, the issues, or what is at stake. We aim to change this situation.

We have been publishing in this space for more than 5 years, and we thank each of you for taking the time to read and consider our work. We look forward to exchanging useful dialogue and learning about copyright, information policy and related matters so that all may “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” and “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”

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Technorati Tags: Copycense, K. Matthew Dames, Lawrence Lessig, Mark Helprin, Siva Vaidhyanathan, William Patry

“Since the U.S. Navy rescued Capt. Richard Phillips in April, many news outlets have been writing about piracy. Interestingly, some news outlets have raised an important question about “piracy” as a term: In light of the ongoing (and newly newsworthy) threat of violence on the high seas, should “piracy” continue to be used to mean theft of works that are protected by copyright or other forms of intellectual property (IP)?

“Stephen J. Dubner, a co-author of The New York Times’ Freakonomics blog, was one of the first to pose the question openly. In his April 13 post, Dubner even asked his audience to suggest substitute names. When he followed up with another post on April 17, he elected the term “downlifting” as the linguistic successor to “piracy.” Dubner’s article followed a pithy analysis by blogger Jenny Kakasuleff of the Indianapolis Liberal Examiner. Kakasuleff’s post was the first I saw this year that questioned the wisdom of using “piracy” within the context of IP, and the timeline on her post suggests she addressed this issue 10 hours before Dubner. Better yet, her lede was flat-out entertaining:

When I heard that “piracy” was the latest buzz word to light up the world wide web, I thought for sure Lars Ulrich had summoned Congress to bellyache about how fans like Metallica’s music so much that they—gasp—download it for their listening pleasure. But alas, all the hype was nothing more than a U.S. Navy showdown with three rogue pirates on a lifeboat, armed with AK-47’s and a hostage. Limewire [sic] lives to see another day.

“Then what does piracy really mean? The term’s definition and history are important along with the reasons why its continued misrepresentation matters to the country’s copyright policy.”

(more …)

K. Matthew Dames. Why the Frame of “Piracy” Matters. Information Today. June 2009.

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Technorati Tags: “piracy”, Copycense, framing & rhetoric, Freakonomics blog, Joe Biden, K. Matthew Dames, The New York Times

[Editor’s Note: This is final part of a three-part series on the intersection of trade agreements, foreign affairs, and U.S. copyright law. Part 1 was published in Copycense on May 27; Part 2 was published on June 2.]

In this article, I focus on proposed legislation in Congress that would make copyright (and other intellectual property issues) a consistent part of U.S. foreign and trade policy via the State Department.

“Hollywood” Howard Berman Goes International

On May 14, Howard Berman (D-CA), chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, introduced bill H.R. 2410 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011). The bill authorizes funding for the Department of State and the Peace Corps. As a funding bill, H.R. 2410 is relatively innocuous: the State Department is one of this country’s most important federal agencies, particularly at this moment, and few can reasonably argue with the Peace Corps and its mission. (Read Secretary Clinton’s statement to Congress about the State Department’s FY 2010 budget.)

Anyone who is familiar with the federal legislative process, however, knows you always — always — must monitor appropriations bills because they attract more pork than a southern Sunday brunch. Treats — not necessarily financial earmarks, but pieces of legislation that serve as a kind of “tribute” to a legislator or powerful constituent — also get passed around like it’s Halloween whenever appropriations bills make the rounds.

The entertainment industry lobby (RIAA and MPAA in particular) have lobbied for, and won, a number of appropriations-based treats over the decades. They have used this tactic quite effectively, taking advantage of a cardinal law of Congressional self-survival: the legislative branch understandably is loathe to keep itself or governmental units running on continuing resolutions, so it is rare that a budget bill will not eventually pass.

Even more accurately, it is rare that a budget bill passes without including special treats for particularly powerful members of Congress.

Congressman Berman has been a particularly powerful member of Congress for quite some time. We (and others) noted Berman’s departure from the House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary (HJC) in January 2008, where he was as consistent a pro-entertainment industry lobbyist as there ever has been. HJC’s jurisdiction includes intellectual property matters; judicial, legislative and administrative law matters; federal prisons; and antitrust.

The Center for Responsive Politics’ Open Secrets Web site reports that during the last full Congress, ending in 2008, Berman received more than $200,000 in contributions from the entertainment industry, and another $67,000 from the technology industry. In comparison, Senator Diane Feinstein received more than $265,000 from the entertainment industry over the same period. (Both totals pale in comparison to the $968,958 the entertainment industry lavished on Sen. Barbara Boxer last Congress.)

But it is a rare opportunity to get a Congressional committee chairmanship, and Berman ceded party seniority on HJC to John Conyers (D-MI), among others. (With the Democratic surge in Congress during the 2008 presidential election, Conyers became HJC’s current chairman.) So it was not particularly surprising that Berman left HJC to chair Foreign Affairs. Berman, however, was not away long enough for his seat to get cool: the same Democratic surge during the last presidential election cycle helped Berman to return to HJC, where he occupies the role of vice chairman.

Regardless of his committee assignments, we figured Berman would be hard pressed to leave behind his blind support for all things Hollywood. And it turns out we were right. Only this time, Berman’s newest nod has a chance to greatly affect the way this country manages its international affairs.

The Leaked X-Men Film & HR 2410

The first sign that Berman would find a way to blend the RIAA and MPAA lobbying agenda into foreign relations came last month, when Berman chaired a hearing in Van Nuys, CA that ostensibly was about “pirated” intellectual property. The context was classically scripted: an unfinished copy of X-Men Origins: Wolverines had been released onto P2P networks just a week earlier, and the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 report (the one that put Canada on the Priority Watch List) was due in the following two weeks.

During the hearing, Berman mentioned he would “begin to elevate the attention” the U.S. gave to perceived and real international acts of copyright infringement, according to The Carpetbagger, a New York Times blog. HR 2410 does just that.

Buried in this appropriations bill, Berman (the bill’s sponsor) throws yet another bone to his old pals in Hollywood. For example, Section 329, entitled “Protection of Intellectual Property Rights,” requires the Secretary of State to “ensure that the protection in foreign countries of the intellectual property rights of United States persons in other countries is a significant component of United States foreign policy in general and in relations with individual countries,” and requires the Secretary of State to “appoint 10 intellectual property attaches to serve in United States embassies or other diplomatic missions.”

According to Section 329(c), the Secretary of State should deploy these attaches “in those countries where [his] activities … may be carried out with the greatest potential benefit to reducing counterfeit and pirated products in the United States market, to protecting the intellectual property rights of United States persons and their licensees, and to protecting the interests of United States persons otherwise harmed by violations of intellectual property rights in those countries.”

According to Section 329(d), these intellectual property attaches would engage in variety of duties, including:

• “[promoting] cooperation with foreign governments in the enforcement of intellectual property laws generally, and in the enforcement of laws against counterfeiting and piracy in particular”;
• “[assisting] United States persons holding intellectual property rights, and the licensees of such United States persons, in their efforts to combat counterfeiting and piracy of their products or works within the host country …”; and
• “[identifying] and [promoting] other means to more effectively combat counterfeiting and piracy activities under the jurisdiction of the host country.”

The kicker? Section 329(f) requires the attaches’ duties to be carried out “in coordination with the United States Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator.” This is the IP czar position that Vice President Biden promised would be filled with a person sympathetic to Hollywood executive concerns.

Next Steps

In short, Berman’s bill, if it passes, would deputize State Department officials to serve as the entertainment industry’s foreign affairs wing. As of this writing, the Foreign Affairs committee has recommended that the entire House consider HR 2410, and the bill was placed on the House’s Union Calendar on June 4.

The next few months will be critical. As a practical matter, HR 2410 must pass before the end of the year, since Congress’ attention will turn to midterm elections beginning in January 2010. Congress recesses in August, and upon its return, will consider to annual spending, tax, and appropriations measures. If HR 2410 is to pass with its current pro-entertainment measures, it is likely to be signed by President Obama in the fall, before Congress takes its holiday recess in December.

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Technorati Tags: Copycense, Howard Berman, Joe Biden, K. Matthew Dames, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)

[Editor’s Note: This is the second of a three-part series on the intersection of trade agreements, foreign affairs, and U.S. copyright law. Part 1 was published on May 28; Part 3 will be published on Tuesday, June 9. Portions of this work are included in a continuing study about the framing of “piracy” and its influence on U.S. copyright law. For ease of reading and formatting, this excludes scholarly references, but replaces them with hyperlinks to source material where such links are available.]

This article summarizes the Special 301 process, including its history, its procedures, and the 2009 Special 301 report.

Background of Section 301

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. sec. 2411), as amended, is the principal statutory authority under which the United States may impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that violate, deny benefits under, or unreasonably discriminate against the U.S. government, or otherwise restrict U.S. commerce, pursuant to a trade agreement. Section 301(a) may be understood as a self-help strategy for discouraging breach of agreement by trading partners.

(a) The Patent Lobby

The seeds for the contemporary Section 301 process were sown in the mid-seventies. Partly as a reaction to the Watergate scandal, Congress adopted several reforms that sought decentralization of government and allowed private companies to influence trade policy. IBM and Pfizer were two of the first companies that recognized the need for a global approach to intellectual property protection. In the late 1970s, the CEOs of these two companies “devised a strategy to improve intellectual property protection internationally until American standards became the international norm, especially in developing countries.”

Pfizer sought “significant reform” of the Paris Convention, while IBM sought patent treaty reform and full copyright implementation under the Berne Convention (especially reforming Berne to recognize the copyrightability of software). Together, the two companies sought multilateral diplomacy through the General Agreement on Trade & Tariffs’ Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiation (“ACTPN”). Pfizer chief executive officer Edmund Pratt and IBM chief executive officer John Opel held high level positions on ACTPN.

By 1985, ACTPN was playing a major role in U.S. trade policy. Around the same time, the U.S. economy was struggling from the effects of large trade deficits with several foreign countries. Industry associations identified and blamed a foreign, monolithic enemy: “pirates.” U.S. corporate executives convinced members of Congress that America’s economy and the nation’s long term economic and innovation competitiveness would improve only if the country passed trade laws that levied stiff punishments for continuing trade violations, especially those that involved “piracy” of intellectual property.

This led to a number of changes to trade policy. For example, ACTPN recommended that the U.S. Office of the Trade Representative (“USTR”) create a post of assistant trade representative for investment; USTR did so in 1981. In 1985, ACTPN established an intellectual property task force in 1985, with Pratt, Opel, and Fritz Attaway serving. (Attaway is executive vice president and Washington general counsel for the Motion Picture Association of America, where he has worked since 1976.)

From this core, ACTPN worked to educate people in Congress and in the executive branch (especially USTR) about the importance of protecting intellectual property rights as a way of facilitating investment in developing countries. Part of the education included targeting Washington policy makers with conferences and books, both of which emphasized that American competitiveness in innovation industries was being hurt by developing countries’ failure to pass or enforce laws that protected American intellectual property. As a result, USTR spent much more time and diplomatic effort in putting intellectual property issues on the GATT Uruguay Round agenda in 1986, ultimately consulting ACTPN on a “GATT strategy.”

(The GATT Uruguay Round strategy was a “carrot and stick” approach to trade and intellectual property negotiations with developing countries. On one hand, the U.S. offered tariff concessions on agricultural and textile products and technical training on intellectual property issues. In exchange, the U.S. wanted higher levels of intellectual property protection to combat “piracy” and counterfeiting. A foreign country’s failure to comply would result in cutting the country’s aid through America’s General System of Preferences, and possible trade sanctions pursuant to Section 301 actions. Said more simply, where bilateral and multilateral trade concessions GATT Uruguay Round are the carrot, Section 301 actions are the stick, a form of unilateral sanctions.)

The Intellectual Property Committee (“IPC”) was another important trade group that started work during this period. IPC’s purpose was to be a spokesman for intellectual property-based companies and lobby their interests in Washington and Geneva. Charter members were Pfizer, IBM, Merck, General Electric, DuPont, Warner Communications, Hewlett-Packard, Bristol-Meyers, FMC Corporation, General Motors, Johnson & Johnson, Monsanto, and Rockwell International.

(b) The Copyright Lobby

While ACTPN and IPC handled multilateral GATT diplomacy strategy, the corporate owners of large copyright portfolios became concerned that the ACTPN was too focused on patent issues. Those companies began seeking their own bilateral strategy to strengthen international copyright laws, resulting in the formation of the International Intellectual Property Alliance (“IIPA”). IIPA charter members included the American Association of Publishers; the Motion Picture Association of America; and the Recording Industry Association of America. The Business Software Association and Interactive Digital Software Association since have joined IIPA.

Created in 1984, IIPA also was established to advocate an agenda for the USTR’s Section 301 report, which Congress codified in the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. Among other things, the 1984 Trade Act clarified the Section 301 review process, for which copyright creators had lobbied. In 1985, IIPA submitted to USTR a report entitled Piracy of U.S. Copyrighted Works in Ten Selected Countries that presented data from IIPA members that estimated $1.3 billion in lost film, music, computer software, and books sales due to “piracy.”

USTR responded by initiating a Section 301 investigation against Korea. Based in part upon this initial report, IIPA lobbied Congress to institutionalize the measurement of copyright problems in foreign countries, leading to an amended Section 301.

Section 301 Process Overview

The Section 301 process works in the following way:

1. Initiation: Any interested party – usually a private sector interest group – files a petition with USTR to request that the government agency investigate a possible trade violation. (USTR also may initiate an investigation on its own.)
2. Publication: USTR publishes its determination to initiate an investigation (or reasons for not initiating in the case of a petition) in the Federal Register.
3. Hearing: A public hearing is required if USTR initiates a Section 301 investigation.
4. Consultations: Once an investigation begins, USTR must request consultations with the foreign government.
5. Settlement: Where an investigation involves an alleged violation of a trade agreement (such as a World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)), USTR must follow the dispute settlement provisions set out in that agreement.
6. Conclusion: USTR must conclude its investigation and make a determination of whether the foreign practice is actionable under Section 301 within 18 months after initiation of an investigation involving a trade agreement that includes a dispute settlement mechanism, or 30 days after conclusion of dispute settlement procedures, which ever comes first.

The Trade Representative’s use of Section 301 as a procedural stick in intellectual property protection is recent. In 1984, USTR held little institutional knowledge about intellectual property matters. At the urging of IIPA members, the Office hired a new deputy trade officer, intellectual property lawyer on staff whose primary job was to advise USTR staff on issues of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Armed with new expertise and IIPA data, USTR started a Section 301 action in fall 1985 against South Korea.

IIPA complained South Korean businesses were extensively “pirating” books, music, film and software, and the organization claimed annual sales losses in Korea totaling $150 million. This may seem an insignificant amount now, but given the time frame – mid-1980s; high inflation; large trade deficits, particularly to Asian countries – this estimate was significant enough to warrant the attention of U.S. government officials. Korean negotiators insisted that the country’s level of development was insufficient to revise its intellectual property laws. The U.S. countered by threatening to strip Korea of its benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences.

In July 1986, Korea and the U.S. reached an agreement whereby Korea would revise its copyright laws, become a signatory to a number of international copyright treaties, and pledge to strengthen penalties against copyright infringement. Korea also pledged more aggressive patent enforcement. This was USTR’s first successful implementation of the Section 301 process against foreign country based upon “piracy.”

It is common for a private sector group to initiate a Section 301 petition against a foreign country because of alleged “piracy” issues. Initiating petitions, however, puts U.S. companies at risk of having foreign governments retaliate against their overseas subsidiaries. The retaliation can take the form of selective regulatory enforcement or questionable contract awards.

To guard against this possibility, Congress in August 1988 passed Special 301 as part of the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. Sponsored by former Illinois Congressman Dan Rostenkowski and referred to in some quarters as a “velvet fist in an iron glove,” Special 301 requires USTR to identify nations that fail to protect the intellectual property rights of U.S. companies by April 30 annually.

Any country whose acts, policies, or practices are “the most onerous or egregious” and have not entered into (or are significantly progressing toward) negotiations to provide adequate and effective intellectual property regulation the USTR must designate as a “priority foreign countries.” Countries that USTR does not designate as “priority foreign countries” may appear on “priority watch” or “watch” lists if the U.S. government is concerned about their intellectual property laws or enforcement practices.

As before the 1988 amendment, industry organizations play a vital role in filing petitions (requiring USTR follow up) and providing evidence of economic losses due to “piracy.” For example, in a response to USTR’s required Federal Register posting requesting public comment on country identification for the Special 301 report, IIPA earlier this year submitted “[its] discussion of the types, levels, and costs of piracy, an evaluation of enforcement practices to reduce those levels, and the status of copyright law reform in 60 separate country reports.” Referencing its Jan. 30, 2007, report entitled “Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy,” (.pdf) IIPA claimed in a 22-page cover letter (.pdf) that

“core” U.S. copyright industries accounted for an estimated $819.06 billion or 6.56% of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005. These “core” industries were responsible for 12.96% of the growth achieved in 2005 for the U.S. economy as a whole (this means that the growth contributed by these core industries (12.96%) was almost double their current dollar share of GDP (6.56%)). In addition, the “core” copyright industries employed 5.38 million workers in 2005 (4.03% of U.S. workers) in 2005.

It is essential to the continued growth and future competitiveness of these industries that our trading partners provide not only free and open markets, but also high levels of protection to the copyrights on which this trade depends. This protection upon which so much U.S. economic performance rests is under constantly evolving threats, and it is critical to sustain U.S. economic competitiveness that our country’s response remains flexible, innovative and committed. There are certain sectors of the U.S. copyright community, notably the music sector, that has already witnessed significant declines in foreign sales and royalty remittances as a consequence of increased levels and new forms of piracy, and it is essential that we address these problems on an urgent basis.

The IIPA mentioned the term “piracy” 93 times in the cover letter. None of those mentions is consistent with the term’s primary definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oxford English Dictionary, or the United States Code.

The 2009 Special 301 Report

The 2009 Special 301 report, which the USTR released on April 30, examined more than 40 countries, placing a dozen (China, Russia, Algeria, Argentina, Canada, Chile, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand and Venezuela) on the “priority watch” list (PWL). The number of countries on the report’s “priority watch list” has remained relatively stable over the years. (In 2007, there were 12 countries on the “priority watch list.” In 2008, nine countries made the list. China, Russia, Argentina, India, and Thailand have made the PWL each of the last three years.)

USTR placed more than 30 additional countries on its 2009 “watch list.”

Canada was perhaps this year’s most surprising inclusion on the 2009 PWL. Over the past three years, Canada has experienced considerable citizen interest in (and resistance against) government proposals to increase the country’s level of copyright protection, most notably through a Facebook group organized by University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist. The citizenry’s effectiveness in halting government proposals to spread stronger protections, however, has led to disapproval from the U.S., its southern neighbor:

[T]he Government of Canada has not delivered on … commitments [to improve IPR protection and enforcement] by promptly and effectively implementing key copyright reforms. The United States continues to have serious concerns with Canada’s failure to accede to and implement the WIPO Internet Treaties, which Canada signed in 1997. We urge Canada to enact legislation in the near term to strengthen its copyright laws and implement these treaties. The United States also continues to urge Canada to improve its IPR enforcement system to enable authorities to take effective action against the trade in counterfeit and pirated products within Canada, as well as curb the volume of infringing products transshipped and transiting through Canada. Canada’s weak border measures continue to be a serious concern for IP owners.

Part of the reform the U.S. wants Canada to pass is C-61, legislation that mirrors the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Since the Canadian government has had difficulty in passing this and similar legislation, the U.S. has placed it alongside perennial PWL countries like Russia and China.

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Technorati Tags: Copycense, K. Matthew Dames, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Special 301